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BEARING CHILDREN, BEARING RISKS: FEMINIST 
LEADERSHIP FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION OF 
COMPENSATED SURROGACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Sara L. Ainsworth* 
Abstract: Compensated surrogacy—an arrangement in which a woman carries and gives 
birth to a child for someone else in exchange for money—intimately affects women. Yet, 
feminist law reformers have not led efforts to regulate this practice in the United States. Their 
absence is notable given the significant influence of feminist lawmaking in a host of other 
areas where women’s interests are at stake. This lack of feminist law reform leadership can 
be understood, however, in light of the complex issues that surrogacy raises—complexity 
that has long divided feminists. 
In response to efforts to pass surrogacy legislation in Washington State in 2010, Legal 
Voice, a women’s rights organization founded in 1978, worked to develop a progressive, 
feminist approach to compensated surrogacy. The organization adopted a framework based 
primarily on two schools of feminist legal thought—an anti-essentialist analysis and a 
pragmatic approach—under the overarching goal of promoting reproductive justice. This 
Article proposes the application of these principles to the development of any surrogacy 
legislation. However, my primary purpose is to urge feminist law advocates to take 
leadership of surrogacy law reform. Whatever the feminist objections to the practice, people 
increasingly engage in surrogacy arrangements to create families and to help others to do so. 
But it is the women who hold the least power and face the highest risk of economic 
exploitation who bear the most significant risks in these arrangements. Thus, it is imperative 
that progressive feminists meet the challenge of addressing the complexity of compensated 
surrogacy, and develop a shared agenda for ensuring reproductive justice in the context of 
assisted reproductive technologies. 
 
* Sara L. Ainsworth is the Director of Legal Advocacy at National Advocates for Pregnant Women, 
a non-profit organization that works to secure the human and civil rights of all women, focusing 
particularly on pregnant and parenting women, and those who are most vulnerable to state control 
and punishment—low income women, women of color, and women with substance addictions. 
From 2002 through 2011 she was senior counsel at Legal Voice, a regional non-profit organization 
dedicated to advancing women’s legal rights in the northwest states. Ms. Ainsworth has taught 
reproductive rights and justice, poverty law, and gender violence as a lecturer at the University of 
Washington School of Law and as Visiting Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law. 
I appreciate the editors of the Washington Law Review for spotlighting the issue of regulating 
compensated surrogacy. This Article grew out of the hard work of Legal Voice and its dedicated 
staff (especially Lisa Stone and Pamela Crone) and numerous brilliant volunteers who contributed 
their thoughtful research and analysis to the Legal Voice Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
workgroup. I also wish to thank Sujatha Jesudason and Lynn Paltrow, whose work and 
conversations inspired me and greatly informed this piece.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Whatever its potential for creating loving families and fairly 
compensating women’s labor, or for harming people whose lives and 
choices are constrained by oppressive legal and social structures, 
compensated surrogacy implicates every area of feminist concern. 
Understanding this, feminist theorists and academics have been deeply 
engaged for almost three decades in considering the complexities of 
compensated surrogacy. Yet, women’s rights groups and feminist law 
reformers outside of academia have not typically led the development of 
jurisprudence or the efforts to regulate this practice in the United States.1 
This absence contrasts starkly with proactive feminist work in the 
areas of domestic and sexual violence law reform, reproductive rights 
jurisprudence, pay and labor equality, lesbian family recognition, and 
family laws generally.2 It can be understood, however, in light of the 
complex issues of gender and sexual orientation equality, racism, 
colonialism, wealth inequality, autonomy, health, and bioethics that 
surrogacy raises.3 This complexity has long divided feminists, both in 
feminist legal thought and in the field of women’s legal rights.4 
This lack of consensus may help explain why Legal Voice, founded in 
1978 as the Northwest Women’s Law Center and a leading voice on 
1. Sociologist Susan Markens describes the reactive (rather than proactive) efforts of women’s 
rights advocates, and the conflict between women’s groups, in state legislative efforts to ban or 
regulate surrogacy in the 1980s and early 1990s. SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 
AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 156–70 (2007); see also Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate 
Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO 
WOMEN’S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTION 1092, 1092 (D. Kelly Weisberg & 
Ronnie J. Steinberg eds., 1996) (introducing arguments in favor of legal enforcement of surrogacy 
contracts with an explanation of the controversy among feminists in the late 1980s). But see 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
109, 115–21 (2009) (describing the feminist response to surrogacy as unified in opposition to 
surrogacy in the late 1980s, and growing more muted in the years since). 
2. See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM (2011) (feminist law reform was critical to the legal recognition of domestic 
violence, although the legal response has not met the needs of all women and their families); 
Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, 
and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249 (1998) (noting the influence of feminist legal 
theory on generations of advocates for women’s legal rights and its role in law reform in numerous 
areas affecting women’s interests). 
3. See infra Part I (exploring this complexity more thoroughly).  
4. See MARKENS, supra note 1, at 156–62 (relating the conflict among California women’s rights 
organizations responding to proposed surrogacy legislation in the late 1980s); Pamela Laufer-
Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1223–26 (2013) 
(providing a succinct overview of the surrogacy debate). 
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women’s issues in Washington State’s courts and legislature,5 was 
missing from the debate during the state’s first legislative response to 
surrogacy. In 1989, the year after the notorious Baby M decision in New 
Jersey,6 Washington State banned compensated surrogacy.7 The 
Washington Legislature did not reconsider the issue—and women’s 
rights advocates never raised it—until a gay legislator lawyer, the father 
of children born to a woman acting as surrogate, proposed lifting the ban 
in 2010.8 
Just as the practice of compensated surrogacy had evolved, so had 
Legal Voice’s willingness to engage with the issue. In 2010, the 
organization recognized the imperative of bringing a progressive, 
feminist voice to the legislative arena—a voice informed as much as 
possible by the experience of women acting as surrogates. After two 
years of community engagement, study, and introspection, Legal Voice 
ultimately developed a progressive, feminist framework for considering 
surrogacy and its legal and social implications for women.9 The 
framework is a set of principles, based primarily on two schools of 
feminist legal thought—an anti-essentialist analysis and a pragmatic 
approach—under the overarching goal of promoting reproductive 
justice.10 
5. See About Us, LEGAL VOICE, http://www.legalvoice.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
6. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2012) (originally enacted in 1989). 
8. H.R. 2793, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010); Terry J. Price, The Future of Compensated 
Surrogacy in Washington: Anytime Soon?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1311 (2014) (providing a 
comprehensive overview of the proposed Washington legislation); see also Molly Rosbach, Bill 
Would Allow Paying Surrogate Mothers in Wash., SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 15, 2011), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2014504976_apwaxgrsurrogatemothers3rdldwritethru.html. 
9. Transgender people may also become intended parents through a surrogacy arrangement, and 
certainly a transgender person with the capacity to become pregnant could act as a surrogate too. 
However, literature on the issue is limited to discussions of transgender people acting as intended 
parents, rather than acting as surrogates. In a comprehensive legal guidebook for transgender 
people, Kylar Broadus and Shannon Price Minter discuss the possibility of transgender parents as 
intended parents (rather than as people acting as surrogates). Kylar W. Broadus & Shannon Price 
Minter, Legal Issues, in TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES, A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER 
COMMUNITY 174, 174–202 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2010). Another resource on transgender, 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual health issues includes a brief discussion of surrogacy, assuming 
transgender people are intended parents, not surrogates. HARVEY J. MAKADON ET AL., THE 
FENWAY GUIDE TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER HEALTH 117–18 (2008). These 
materials, as well as media reports, academic writings, and anecdotal reports from women acting as 
surrogates indicate that the vast majority of people who become surrogates identify as women, and 
are identified as such in the legislative debates over surrogacy. For these reasons, I use the gendered 
phrase “women acting as surrogates” throughout this article. On a different note, I also use this term 
because I find “surrogate” and “gestator,” the terms commonly used in this setting, dehumanizing. 
10. Reproductive justice is not a replacement term for reproductive rights or abortion rights. 
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As a former Legal Voice attorney who helped to develop this 
response, I write in part to share this framework and urge the application 
of these principles to the development of any surrogacy legislation. 
However, Legal Voice was not the first to offer a framework and model 
for surrogacy regulation.11 What I seek to add to the discussion is a call 
to feminist law reform projects to develop a shared agenda for ensuring 
reproductive justice in the context of assisted reproductive technologies, 
and, most importantly, to take leadership in the field of surrogacy 
regulation. The risks of compensated surrogacy arrangements are 
primarily borne by the women acting as surrogates, who typically hold 
less power than other parties to these arrangements and are more likely 
to be subject to economic exploitation.12 Progressive feminists thus must 
meet the challenge of addressing surrogacy’s complexity in the 
legislatures and the courts. This work should focus on ensuring the 
humanity and dignity of the women whose interests are most at stake in 
the surrogacy debate. 
 In Part I of this Article, I explore some of the primary feminist 
concerns about compensated surrogacy, including one that has been less 
examined, and in Part II, I consider the actual experience of surrogacy as 
currently practiced in states where it is legal in the United States. In Part 
III, I describe progressive feminist principles for regulating surrogacy 
that draw from pragmatic feminism, an anti-essentialist approach, and 
reproductive justice. Finally, in Part IV, I apply those principles to 
specific provisions of proposed surrogacy regulation, and in conclusion, 
argue that surrogacy will continue to put women acting as surrogates at 
risk if feminist law reformers fail to assume leadership of proactive 
Forward Together (formerly Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice) states that reproductive 
justice exists  
when all people have the social, political and economic power and resources to make healthy 
decisions about our gender, bodies, sexuality and families for our selves and our communities. 
Reproductive Justice aims to transform power inequities and create long-term systemic change, 
and therefore relies on the leadership of communities most impacted by reproductive 
oppression. 
What Is Reproductive Justice?, ASIAN COMMUNITIES FOR REPROD. JUST., 
http://strongfamiliesmovement.org/what-is-reproductive-justice (last visited Oct. 5, 2014); see also 
infra Part III. 
11. See Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate 
Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2346 (1995); Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial 
Answer to Feminist Criticism, 54 MD. L. REV. 488 (1995); Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4; Katherine 
Leiber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy be Answered?, 68 IND. L. J. 205, 
225–32 (1992); Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of 
Female Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 720 (2003).  
12. The experiences of people who are parties to reproductive tourism in India and other 
countries provide powerful examples of this disparity. See infra Part I. 
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efforts to regulate surrogacy in the United States. 
I. COMPLEXITIES OF SURROGACY THROUGH A FEMINIST 
LENS 
Compensated surrogacy13 garnered national attention in the late 1980s 
when Mary Beth Whitehead agreed, in exchange for $10,000, to become 
pregnant and give the child to William and Elizabeth Stern. William 
provided the sperm; Elizabeth, his wife, was not biologically related to 
the child.14 After she relinquished the baby to the Sterns, Mary Beth 
Whitehead changed her mind.15 The resulting legal conflict made 
national headlines,16 and led to both a surge in legislation17 (usually to 
ban surrogacy) and significant feminist engagement with the subject.18 
As feminist theory is not monolithic, the responses from feminists varied 
dramatically.19 
13. Compensated surrogacy—the agreement to bear a child for someone else in exchange for 
money—is also called commercial surrogacy. While the second term is also apt, it connotes a mere 
market exchange and ignores the empirical and anecdotal evidence that shows that these agreements 
have deep emotional meaning to the parties. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1227 (arguing that 
surrogacy arrangements are both commercial and intimate exchanges and that this hybrid nature of 
the contract is not adequately recognized under current legal structures). Accordingly, I use the term 
“compensated surrogacy” throughout this Article. 
14. This type of surrogacy arrangement—where the woman who carries the child is also the 
genetic mother—is known as “traditional” surrogacy. “Gestational” surrogacy, in contrast, is an 
arrangement where a physician implants an embryo created by the egg and sperm of other parties 
(typically, but not always, from one or more of the intended parents) into the uterus of the woman 
acting as surrogate. Vasanti Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experiences of Surrogate Mothers, 18 
HUM. REPROD. 2196, 2196 (2003). 
15. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235–37 (N.J. 1988).  
16. See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Father of Baby M Granted Custody; Contract Upheld; Surrogacy Is 
Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1987, at A1. See also MARKENS, supra note 1, at 120 (identifying 270 
articles written about surrogacy and the Baby M case during the custody trial, and ninety-nine 
additional articles dedicated to the court’s decision in 1988). It appears that the press is reluctant to 
let go of the controversy; in May of 2014, the New York Times revisited the case. Clyde Haberman, 
Baby M and the Question of Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/us/baby-m-and-the-question-of-surrogate-motherhood.html. 
17. See MARKENS, supra note 1, at 22; Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional 
Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal Prohibition on 
Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1285−87 (2014). 
18. MARKENS, supra note 1, at 16–17. Some of the feminist writings on surrogacy from that time 
period include: MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 
(1990); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989); Andrews, supra note 
1; and Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M, THE NATION (May 23, 1987), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/strange-case-baby-m# (critiquing the Baby M decision and 
arguing that compensated surrogacy “bear[s] an uncanny resemblance to the all-sales-final style of a 
used-car lot”). 
19. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Lisa Mccauley Rarles, In the Matter of Baby M, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. 
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A group of prominent feminists argued against the practice of 
compensated surrogacy in an amicus brief filed in the Baby M case.20 
While part of their concern was for the way in which Mary Beth 
Whitehead’s parenting had been maligned by the court and in the press 
for absurd and sexist reasons,21 they also argued that surrogacy exploited 
poor women and commodified women’s bodies.22 Liberal feminists 
disagreed, and argued that states should permit compensated surrogacy 
to ensure a woman’s right to self-determination and to fairly compensate 
her for what is inarguably difficult and risky work.23 Critical race 
scholars urged a comparison to the ways in which the bodies of women 
of color have been long controlled and targeted for impositions and 
restrictions on their childbearing and parenting, and expressed concerns 
with the ability of a nation so steeped in racial injustice to prevent 
further inequities and exploitation of the bodies and lives of women of 
color.24 
Since the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Baby M decision in 1988, the 
practice and empirical understanding of compensated surrogacy has 
evolved. But the lack of consensus in feminist thought is still present, 
and, I argue, has stymied the ability of feminist law reformers, in most 
instances, to meaningfully engage in the legal and legislative response to 
surrogacy. This is particularly troubling because, as Susan Markens 
demonstrates in her book Surrogate Motherhood, the legislative 
discussion around surrogacy invariably casts it as a “women’s issue.”25 
When all claim to promote women’s rights, the voice of feminist law 
reformers—so present in molding the law affecting sexual and domestic 
violence, family laws, reproductive rights, and employment equality—is 
sidelined. That is especially true when those who can legitimately speak 
for women’s interests present divergent views on the issue. 
While feminists should continue the dialogue and ultimately take 
ownership of the question of compensated surrogacy, there are powerful 
L. REP. 243, 249 (1992). 
20. Elizabeth Mehren, Feminists Fight Court Ruling in Baby M Decision: Steinem, Friedan, 
Chesler, French Among Supporters, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1987, at 1. 
21. Iver Peterson, Fitness Test for Baby M’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
1987, at B1. 
22. Mehren, supra note 20. 
23. See generally, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, supra note 1. 
24. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 276–85 (1st ed. 1999); Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17, 19 (1991) (“Without a per se ban on commercial surrogacy, it is not 
clear that poor and Black women can be protected from the risks of surrogacy arrangements.”). 
25. MARKENS, supra note 1, at 62–66. 
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reasons for holding conflicted views on the issue. Numerous scholars, 
lawyers, and reporters have reflected on the complex questions of 
commercial surrogacy. Reconsidering some of those concerns here is 
necessary to explain the tensions facing women’s rights supporters in 
crafting a progressive, feminist response to compensated surrogacy. 
While the complexities are many,26 I focus on four that I believe are 
critical to consider in a progressive approach to surrogacy regulation: (1) 
the risks of exploitation, especially for low-income women of color and 
women acting as surrogates for people from other countries; (2) the 
relationship between women’s health, health care access, and assisted 
reproductive technologies; (3) the intersection of surrogacy with the 
rights to family formation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
queer (LGBTQ) people, and the related influence of discourse that 
emphasizes genetic relationship to children; and finally (4) how 
surrogacy discourse and practices affect people too often excluded from 
the dialogue, specifically people with disabilities. 
A. The Risk of Exploitation 
Of all the possible objections to allowing compensated surrogacy to 
flourish, the one that has been most often articulated—by feminists and 
non-feminists alike—is the fear that women acting as surrogates will be 
exploited. Proponents of this viewpoint urge that the possibility of acting 
as a surrogate to earn money will encourage women to become 
surrogates because other financial options are unavailable to them.27 
26. See, e.g., Susan Berke Fogel et al., Invoking Choice When Discussing Surrogacy as a 
Feminist Concern Is a Mistake, RH REALITY CHECK (Apr. 23, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/ 
article/2014/04/23/invoking-choice-discussing-surrogacy-feminist-concern-mistake/ (urging that a 
simplistic assertion of “choice” as the answer to the dilemmas of surrogacy elides the many difficult 
social justice questions inherent in “contract pregnancy,” including questions of class, cross-border 
surrogacy, and reproductive autonomy). For a thorough overview of the feminist response in the 
context of surrogacy in India (addressed infra) see Birthing a Market: A Study on Commercial 
Surrogacy, SAMA–RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN & HEALTH, http://www.samawomenshealth.org/ 
downloads/Birthing%20A%20Market.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Birthing a Market]. 
27. See, e.g., Barbara Katz Rothman, Daddy Plants a Seed: Personhood Under Patriarchy, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1246 (1996) (arguing “[y]ou have only to look at the poor women of color 
tending their white affluent charges in the playgrounds of every American city to understand which 
women will be carrying valued white babies in their bellies as a cheap service”). Another common 
objection to surrogacy, that I will not address here, is that it turns children into commodities. See 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (in the context of upholding a gestational 
surrogacy contract, the court briefly considers then rejects these arguments); MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 64 (1996). “Baby-selling” is also one of the primary objections 
offered by social conservatives who oppose surrogacy. See, e.g., Wesley J. Smith, Biological 
Colonialism Surrogacy Fraudsters, NATI’L REV. (July 30, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
human-exceptionalism/384136/biological-colonialism-surrogacy-fraudsters-wesley-j-smith (in a 
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While the analogy to sex work is often made,28 it is not necessary to 
compare surrogacy to sex work29 to see the potential ramifications of 
offering thousands of dollars for approximately ten months of work, in a 
setting where there is very little competition (and none from men) for 
women of reproductive age. Especially for lower wage earners, who are 
unlikely to earn such a significant amount of money in such a relatively 
short time, the offer could be very financially attractive. 
1. The Role of Race and Class in Reproduction in the United States 
However, viewing surrogacy as a simple monetary transaction 
obscures the long and brutal history of state and state-sanctioned control 
of the reproduction, childbearing, and parenting of women of color, 
especially African American and Native American women, whose 
particular histories of enslavement and colonization in the United States 
continue to inform law and policy.30 As Dorothy Roberts has explained 
in Killing the Black Body, enslaved African and African American 
women’s reproductive capacity was severed from their motherhood 
during slavery, and rape by white men was used to subjugate women and 
enslave their children.31 Anita Allen argues that, effectively, enslaved 
women were surrogate mothers for the white men who owned them, 
bearing children to whom they had no parental rights who were also the 
property of the slave owner.32 The ongoing subjection of African 
American women—especially poor women—to coercive reproductive 
policies in the welfare programs and through the drug war remains a 
reality.33 African American women are disproportionately poor,34 
commentary on surrogacy arrangements between United States intended parents and women acting 
as surrogates in Mexico and India, exclaiming, “[b]abies are being purchased like lumber at Home 
Depot!”). 
28. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 82–83 (2006) (explaining that surrogacy is frequently likened to sex 
work). 
29. It is beyond the scope of this paper to do justice to the complexity of the analogy. Moreover, 
as an advocate for the decriminalization of sex work, and consistent with my stance of recognizing 
the humanity of people who engage in surrogacy contracts, I am not willing to make the comparison 
in the service of demonizing either practice. 
30. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 282–83; ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE (2005) (recounting the sexual and reproductive 
violence perpetrated by European colonizers of the Native American land and peoples of the current 
United States, including rape, sexual abuse, and the forced separation of children from their families 
and cultures). 
31. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 22–55. 
32. Allen, supra note 24, at 18–19. 
33. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 150–245. 
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disproportionately incarcerated,35 and disproportionately targets of 
welfare laws36 and judicial interventions37 that coerce them to have 
fewer children or use potentially dangerous contraception. 
Women of color incarcerated in California have recently been the 
targets of coercive sterilization,38 a practice that echoes the forced and 
coerced sterilizations of women on welfare and Native American women 
receiving health care through the Indian Health Services in the 1960s 
and early 1970s.39 To this day, women in poverty—but especially poor 
women of color—are overrepresented in the child welfare system, 
meaning that they are more likely to have their parenting, let alone their 
reproduction, interrogated, monitored, and too often disrupted by the 
34. Alexandra Cawthorne, The Straight Facts on Women and Poverty,  FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 
(Oct. 2008), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2008/10/pdf/ 
women_poverty.pdf (“Over a quarter of black women and nearly a quarter of Latina women are 
poor. Black and Latina women are at least twice as likely as white women to be living in poverty.”). 
35. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS 
IN 2010, at 7 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf (noting that in 2010, 
African American women were incarcerated at three times the rate of white women). 
36. Sanford F. Schram, Race and State Welfare Reform Choices: A Cause for Concern, in FROM 
POVERTY TO PUNISHMENT: HOW WELFARE REFORM PUNISHES THE POOR 89, 92–100 (Gary 
Delgado ed., 2002) (explaining that states with higher percentages of African American and Latina 
recipients are more likely to enact “get-tough” welfare policies, such as family caps, that target the 
procreation of mothers receiving welfare by limiting the number of children for whom a recipient 
can receive additional monthly funds); see also Gary Delgado & Rebecca Gordon, From Social 
Contract to Social Control: Welfare Policy and Race, in FROM POVERTY TO PUNISHMENT: HOW 
WELFARE REFORM PUNISHES THE POOR 25, 45–57 (describing the racist origins of welfare reform 
rhetoric and noting the sexual and reproductive control policies in the welfare program); ROBERTS, 
supra note 24, at 203–45 (also exploring the racist origins of welfare reform rhetoric, and linking 
that rhetoric and sexual and reproductive control policies to the demonization of black motherhood 
from the time of slavery and throughout United States history). 
37. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 151–71 (describing, among other interventions, a case in which a 
judge gave a woman the “choice” between a longer prison sentence and probation on condition that 
she be implanted with Norplant, a long-acting contraceptive that requires medical removal); Lynn 
M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United 
States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 299, 300–01 (2013) (documenting hundreds of arrests, prosecutions, forced cesarean 
sections, and other forced medical interventions directed at pregnant women during the period 
studied, and finding that “low-income women and women of color, especially African American 
women, are overrepresented among those who have been arrested or subjected to equivalent 
deprivations of liberty”). 
38. See Sara Ainsworth & Rachel Roth, “If They Hand You a Paper, You Sign It”: A Call to End 
the Sterilization of Women in Prison, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (forthcoming December 2014); 
Robin Levi et al., Prisons as a Tool of Reproductive Oppression, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 309 (2009); 
Corey G. Johnson, Female Inmates Sterilized in California Prisons Without Approval, CENTER FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (July 7, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/female-inmates-sterilized-
california-prisons-without-approval-4917. 
39. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 89–96; see also Ainsworth & Roth, supra note 38. 
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state.40 
Given the deep structural inequities that remain entrenched in United 
States law and society, why should we allow and spend resources 
regulating arrangements that increase the reproductive capacity of 
affluent, most often white,41 people when the reproductive health, 
equality, and self-determination of people of color remains at risk? We 
are not so far from a time when the bodies of women of color could be 
legally owned, and the United States still grapples with structural 
vestiges of that history, as well as the ongoing trafficking of people for 
labor and sex work both within and to this country.42 While it appears 
that surrogates in the United States have not typically been low-income 
women of color or women who consider themselves coerced into the 
practice, concerns of exploitation are present in another surrogacy 
practice of intended parents in the United States: reproductive tourism, 
or contracting with a woman from another country to act as a surrogate. 
2. Reproductive Tourism and the India Experience 
The advent of a lucrative surrogacy industry in India43 has been 
extensively described in recent years—and with particular concern from 
feminists in India and around the world.44 International surrogacy 
40. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 
(2002).  
41. There is little recent empirical research that focuses on the demographics of intended parents, 
as opposed to women acting as surrogates. A 1988 federal resource indicated that ninety-five 
percent of intended parents were white. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 
INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 269 (1988). Given the demographics of race and 
affluence in the United States, and the expense of surrogacy arrangements, it is a safe assumption (if 
only an assumption) that at this time, the majority of intended parents in the United States are white. 
42. See, e.g., HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 4 (2009), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/humantrafficking/litrev/index.pdf (estimating that 600,000 to 
800,000 people are trafficked into the United States annually, and an additional 200,000 to 400,000 
people are victims of domestic trafficking). 
43. Lucrative, that is, for the Indian surrogacy industry, which brought in an estimated 20 billion 
dollars in 2011. Preeti Nayak, The Three Ms of Commercial Surrogacy in India: Mother, Money, 
and Medical Market, in GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL SURROGACY IN INDIA: 
OUTSOURCING LIFE 1, 2 (Sayantani DasGupta & Shamita Das Dasgupta eds., 2014). 
44. Id.; see also FRANCE WINDDANCE TWINE, OUTSOURCING THE WOMB: RACE, CLASS, AND 
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY IN A GLOBAL MARKET (2011); Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting 
the Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. 
FAM. L. 13, 82–85 (2010); Sreeja Jaiswal, Commercial Surrogacy in India: An Ethical Assessment 
of Existing Legal Scenario from the Perspective of Women’s Autonomy and Reproductive Rights, 16 
GENDER TECH. & DEV. 1 (2012); Amrita Pande, Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a 
Perfect Mother-Worker, 35 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 969 (2010); Birthing a Market, supra 
note 26, at 7. 
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arrangements are popular in part because many countries (and states in 
the United States) ban or strictly limit commercial surrogacy within their 
borders.45 Intended parents seeking to have a child through a surrogacy 
arrangement go to the states or countries where surrogacy is permitted 
or, in the case of India, expressly sanctioned by law.46 
Women acting as surrogates in India are typically paid significantly 
less than women acting as surrogates in the United States,47 but there are 
additional reasons beyond cost that attract intended parents to surrogacy 
arrangements there. First, the practice is not underground; India 
expressly legalized commercial surrogacy in 2002.48 In addition, 
medical care in India is of comparable quality to the intended parents’ 
home countries, and, as will be explained more thoroughly below, 
intended parents appreciate the ability to closely monitor the women 
acting as surrogates.49 And, until recently, gay couples and single adults 
could enter into surrogacy arrangements there.50 
Feminists in India, as well as in the United States and in other 
countries, have expressed deep concern about the practice of 
reproductive tourism. Before considering those concerns, it is important 
to point out that Western feminist critique (as opposed to that of 
feminists in India) must recognize its cultural distance when critiquing 
the experiences and practices that affect women in India. As Alison 
Bailey points out, Western feminists have frequently presented Western 
ideas as “liberating” and viewed women in the Global South as 
“backward, poor, illiterate, culturally oppressed, and in need of 
rescue.”51 It is important to recognize that limitation when considering 
45. See Nicolas, supra note 17, at 1239−45. 
46. Scott Carney, Inside India’s Rent-a-Womb Business, MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2010), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/02/surrogacy-tourism-india-nayna-patel. 
47. See Indian Surrogacy Helps Lift Some Poor, But Raises Ethical Issues, PBS NEWSHOUR 
(Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/globalhealth-july-dec11-surrogates_08-05/ (the 
entire costs of a surrogacy arrangement in India are about $10,000 to $15,000, and the woman 
acting as a surrogate receives approximately $7,000); Deborah L. Cohen, Surrogate Pregnancies on 
Rise Despite Cost Hurdles, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid= 
USBRE92H11Q20130318 (costs of surrogacy in the United States range from $75,000 to $120,000 
or more for the entire process; in the example cited in this article, the surrogates themselves 
received from $30,000 to $35,000). 
48. Carney, supra note 46. 
49. Birthing a Market, supra note 26, at 7. 
50. See, e.g., Nilanjana Bhowmick, Why People Are So Angry About India’s New Surrogacy 
Rules, TIME (Feb. 15, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/02/15/why-people-are-angry-about-indias-
new-surrogacy-laws/. 
51. Alison Bailey, Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian 
Surrogacy, 26 HYPATIA 715, 717 (2011). 
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critique from feminists outside India. 
What has concerned feminists (and ethicists) so greatly about 
reproductive tourism is the huge disparity in wealth between the women 
acting as surrogates and the intended parents, as well as the distance 
between them that necessitates an arms-length transaction and third 
party involvement.52 All of these factors tend to diminish the power of 
the women acting as surrogates relative to the power of the intended 
parents. The practice around surrogacy in India is of concern as well. 
The Ashanksa Fertility Clinic in the state of Gujarat has gained fame 
(and notoriety) for taking a significant amount of the money in the 
transaction, for requiring the women acting as surrogates to spend their 
pregnancies in a compound away from their families where their diet 
and activities are monitored, and for encouraging unnecessary cesarean 
births.53 And yet, women who act as surrogates in India frequently earn 
several times what they could otherwise earn in a year, enabling them to 
purchase homes or send their own children to school.54 In short, India’s 
situation presents precisely the dilemma that so vexes feminists in the 
United States—the risk that women’s bodies and lives will be 
additionally subject to state and private control when economic need 
leads them to employ their reproductive capacity as wage labor. 
3. Pregnant Women and State Control 
There is a real risk that women engaged in surrogacy arrangements in 
the United States, as well as in other countries, will be subject to 
intrusive, even punitive constraints on their liberty. The experiences of 
some women acting as surrogates in India is an example. In the United 
States, where feminist movement gains in recent decades have wrought 
significant change for women, the rhetoric of choice elides the fact that 
for many pregnant women, not only is access to abortion difficult or 
impossible, but drug policy and the rise of mass incarceration have 
together created a two-tiered system of reproductive access and 
control.55 
52. See, e.g., Amrita Pande, Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India: Gifts for Global 
Sisters?, 23 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 618, 623 (2011) (“As transactions in reproductive services 
cross borders, the differences between the buyers and sellers, whether based on race, class or 
nationality, become glaring. Unarguably, transnational commercial surrogacy in India is shaped by 
profound inequities in power.”); see also Birthing a Market, supra note 26, at 25–26, 103. 
53. See PBS NEWSHOUR, supra note 47. 
54. Id. 
55. See generally Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37; see also JEANNE FLAVIN, OUR BODIES, OUR 
CRIMES: THE POLICING OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTION IN AMERICA 20–21, 105–21 (2009); 
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As Lynn Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin have documented, pregnant 
women throughout the United States are subject to arrest, prosecution, 
conviction, or other judicial interventions.56 Pregnant women have been 
and are currently being prosecuted or subjected to additional charges, 
longer jail sentences, and higher bail because of drug use (including use 
of prescribed medication), mental health problems, or abortion.57 
Newborn children have been taken from their mothers by child welfare 
systems because their mothers took a drug during pregnancy—even in 
the absence of any demonstrated harm to the newborn.58 Other pregnant 
women have been ordered by courts and forced by their physicians to 
have cesarean surgeries.59 Poor women of color are more likely to be 
targeted for such interventions and punishment.60 
These arrests and interventions reflect what concerns feminists about 
surrogacy, too. When courts enforce surrogacy contracts, such contracts 
present yet another opportunity for state-sanctioned control of pregnant 
women. Indeed, surrogacy contracts in states that allow the practice may 
be used to limit and control the decisions, actions, and self-determination 
of pregnant women. For example, Illinois’ surrogacy law permits the 
enforcement of surrogacy contracts that include terms that restrain the 
pregnant woman’s decision-making and autonomy, including the 
ROBERTS, supra note 24 at 150–94. 
56. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37, at 312. 
57. Id.; see also McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming, in 
part, district court’s decision enjoining Idaho’s prosecution of woman who self-induced an abortion 
with medication she obtained online); Nina Liss-Schultz, First Woman Arrested Under Tennessee 
Pregnancy Criminalization Law, for a Drug Not Covered Under the Law, RH REALITY CHECK 
(July 10, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/07/10/first-woman-arrested-tennessee-
pregnancy-criminalization-law-drug-covered-law/ (reporting the first arrest of a woman for assault 
in relation to a positive toxicology screen at the birth of her child, pursuant to Tennessee’s highly 
controversial law amending its fetal homicide statute to allow the prosecution of pregnant women 
and new mothers). 
58. See, e.g., Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37, at 318–19 (explaining that even a mistaken belief 
that a pregnant woman has used drugs has led to state interventions against pregnant women and 
new mothers); Kristen Gwynne, Victory for Woman Whose Newborn Baby Was Taken Away After 
Poppyseed Bagel Caused Positive Drug Test, ALTERNET (July 3, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/ 
drugs/new-mother-who-failed-drug-test-due-poppy-seed-bagel-gets-baby-back. 
59. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1261–64 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing lower court’s grant 
of court order forcing Angela Carder (A.C.), a pregnant cancer patient, to have a cesarean section 
without her consent; tragically, the cesarean section led to the death of both Ms. Carder and her 
baby). 
60. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37, at 311–12; AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 321: MATERNAL DECISION MAKING, ETHICS, AND THE 
LAW 8–9 (2005), http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on% 
20Ethics/co321.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20140913T2016315945 (citing studies that found that the vast 
majority of court-ordered cesarean sections were directed at poor women of color). 
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woman’s 
agreement to abstain from any activities that the intended parent 
or parents or the physician reasonably believes to be harmful to 
the pregnancy and future health of the child, including, without 
limitation, smoking, drinking alcohol, using nonprescribed 
drugs, using prescription drugs not authorized by a physician 
aware of the gestational surrogate’s pregnancy, exposure to 
radiation, or any other activities proscribed by a health care 
provider.61 
Such a provision was also in place in the contract at issue in the well-
known surrogacy decision in Johnson v. Calvert,62 but because that 
contract contained a contradictory provision regarding abortion, the 
California Supreme Court did not address the question of whether that 
provision could be enforced.63 
Some intended parents who make surrogacy arrangements have 
expectations that reinforce the concern that pregnant women’s liberty is 
at risk. As Sharmila Rudrappa explains, a consistent theme among 
intended parents contracting with Indian women as surrogates is the 
desire of the intended parents to regulate the life of the pregnant 
woman.64 One couple working with a United States woman acting as 
surrogate described being distressed that the pregnant woman was taking 
night classes, and secretly relieved when her physician recommended 
bed rest for the remainder of the pregnancy.65 Other intended parents 
who had made surrogacy arrangements with women in India described 
appreciating the more controlled environment, believing that the women 
were less likely to do something that endangered the pregnancy.66 While 
it is understandable that intended parents want to ensure prenatal health, 
it is another thing entirely to judicially enforce contracts that constrain 
the liberty of pregnant women to make decisions about their own health 
and lives. 
61. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 25-(d)2 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). 
62. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
63. Id. at 784 (“We note that although at one point the contract purports to give Mark and 
Crispina the sole right to determine whether to abort the pregnancy, at another point it 
acknowledges: ‘All parties understand that a pregnant woman has the absolute right to abort or not 
abort any fetus she is carrying. Any promise to the contrary is unenforceable.’ We therefore need 
not determine the validity of a surrogacy contract purporting to deprive the gestator of her freedom 
to terminate the pregnancy.”). 
64. Sharmila Rudrappa, Mother India: Outsourcing Labor to Indian Surrogate Mothers, in 
GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL SURROGACY IN India, supra note 43, at 125, 135–40. 
65. Id. at 138. 
66. Id. at 137–38. 
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Under such a scheme, the civil rights and self-determination of 
pregnant women would become secondary to the concerns of the 
intended parents—and subject to state control and intervention through 
judicial enforcement. And when pregnant women’s lives can be 
monitored and controlled, all women’s status as rights bearers and 
constitutional persons is at risk. So a challenge for feminists in 
considering surrogacy is how to protect the rights of pregnant women 
from coercive interventions. This challenge is compounded for feminists 
because surrogacy arrangements have also become an important route to 
parenthood for gay (but not necessarily lesbian) couples, whose own 
rights to self-determination and privacy have only recently been 
vindicated in some contexts and jurisdictions.67 
B. Rights to Family Formation and the Question of Genetic Ties 
Whatever challenges surrogacy poses for feminist concerns regarding 
women’s self-determination and freedom from exploitation, it also has 
increasingly been a process by which gay male couples, in particular, 
have children and create families.68 A key feminist project has been to 
free people in society from constricting gender roles.69 Ensuring equal 
family recognition for lesbian and gay families is part of that project, 
although lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer activists, 
including people of color, have also argued either that the attainment of 
marriage equality and other family rights are not sufficient or that they 
are the wrong goal.70 While gay couples increasingly turn to women 
acting as surrogates to form families, legalizing surrogacy has not been a 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, __U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down Defense 
of Marriage Act’s marriage definition as a liberty deprivation); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) (holding that laws that criminalize sexual intimacy between consenting adults of the same 
sex violate the right to privacy). 
68. See generally Nicolas, supra note 17 (describing his experience of having a child with his 
husband through a surrogacy arrangement); Miriam Pérez, Surrogacy: The Next Frontier for 
Reproductive Justice, RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 23, 2010), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2010/ 
02/23/surrogacy-next-frontier-reproductive-justice/. 
69. See Martha A. Fineman, Gender and Law: Feminist Legal Theory’s Role in New Legal 
Realism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 405, 407 (2005) (“Feminism, as a discipline, is focused on the 
significance of gender and the societal inequalities resulting from values and assumptions based on 
gender. As a group, feminists are concerned with the implications of historic and contemporary 
exploitation of women within society, seeking the empowerment of women and the transformation 
of institutions dominated by men.”). 
70. See, e.g., DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE 33 (2011) (critiquing the emphasis on marriage 
equality and hate crimes laws, arguing that “legal equality goals threaten to provide nothing more 
than adjustments to the window-dressing of neoliberal violence that ultimately disserve and further 
marginalize the most vulnerable trans populations”). 
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major priority for LGBTQ rights activists either.71 
But it is a mistake to assume that surrogacy laws have not 
contemplated LGBTQ families. In fact, some states’ surrogacy laws 
have been yet another locus for legally enshrining discrimination against 
LGBTQ people. In Florida, for example, surrogacy provisions explicitly 
prohibit anyone who is not “legally married” from engaging in 
surrogacy; the state, as of this writing, bans marriage between partners 
of the same sex.72 For feminists who seek to undermine notions of 
marriage that cabin women’s roles, to ensure equality and legal 
recognition for lesbian and gay families, and to challenge any law that 
expressly discriminates on the basis of sexuality, surrogacy laws present 
the difficult challenge of balancing potentially competing human needs 
and concerns. This challenge is compounded by the fact that most gay 
(and straight) couples who engage in surrogacy often support these 
arrangements by linking them to their desire to have “their own”—i.e., a 
genetically related—child.73 
The question of whether genetic relationship makes a parent is 
another difficult wrinkle of surrogacy. Perhaps it is the most difficult 
challenge, as it is one of the driving forces behind the practice in the first 
place. It goes without saying that there are other ways to become a 
parent, and genetic relationship is not the only reason people engage in 
surrogacy arrangements. As noted above, homophobia has led to 
discriminatory adoption laws and practices in several states, preventing 
gay people—and in some states any single person—from adopting a 
child, leaving surrogacy as one of a very limited number of options. But 
intended parents consistently frame their desire for a genetically related 
child as their reason for entering into a surrogacy arrangement; this is 
not surprising because, as sociologist Olga van den Akker explains, 
“current law and most cultural values define parenthood and the family 
in biological terms.”74 But should this desire for genetically related 
71. One exception is the Washington State legislative experience, where a gay legislator led the 
efforts to repeal the state ban on compensated surrogacy. See Rosbach, supra note 8. 
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2013). However, the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States. v. Windsor calls into question the constitutionality of 
laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–96. 
73. See, e.g., Olga van den Akker, The Importance of a Genetic Link in Mothers Commissioning 
a Surrogate Baby in the UK, 15 HUM. REPROD. 1849, 1853 (2000). 
74. Olga van den Akker, Psychosocial Aspects of Surrogate Motherhood, 13 HUM. REPROD. 
UPDATE 53, 54 (2007). I must point out that people who want to and can conceive through sexual 
intercourse get to make the decision to have genetically related children without scrutiny (myself 
included). Rarely are they criticized for bringing a baby into the world when there are children 
available for adoption, but that critique is routinely leveled at people who have children with the 
help of a woman acting as surrogate. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 286 (suggesting, in the 
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children be legally supported from a feminist perspective? 
In Parentage of L.B.,75 Legal Voice (then the Northwest Women’s 
Law Center) argued that a person who parents a child is the child’s 
parent, and should be recognized as such in law.76 In that case, the 
Washington State Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of “de 
facto parenthood,” allowing the non-biological mother of a child to 
defend her parental rights.77 Countless grandmothers, grandfathers, 
aunts, uncles, siblings, friends, and neighbors in the United States care 
for children as kinship caregivers, often without formal legal 
recognition.78 To insist that genetics makes a parent undermines the 
rights of people to legal and social recognition of their families.79 
Moreover, the Uniform Parentage Act, the model law on legal parentage 
adopted, in some form, by most states, expressly acknowledges that a 
person who did not contribute a gamete to create a child may 
nonetheless be a legal parent, with all the rights and responsibilities that 
status entails.80 
Surrogacy laws in many states, however, place a strong emphasis on 
genetic ties. In Illinois, for example—a state with what is arguably one 
of the most progressive surrogacy laws to date—LGBTQ families are 
not excluded from participation, but only gestational surrogacy is within 
context of exploring the potential racist and eugenic implications of assisted reproductive 
technologies, “[i]t would be hypocritical to condemn people who resort to new reproductive 
technologies for having the same desires for their children as more conventional parents, whose 
decisions are not so scrutinized”). There are, of course, people who believe that it is 
environmentally irresponsible and selfish for anyone to have children, but that is a different critique. 
75. In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash. 2d 679, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005). 
76. Id. at 702–09, 173–77. 
77. Id. at 712, 179; see also S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(recognizing a non-adoptive, non-biological mother as a legal parent of the children she held out as 
her own, and noting that “numerous states have recognized the parental rights of same-sex co-
parents who do not have a biological or adoptive relationship with a child”). 
78. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., KINSHIP CAREGIVERS AND THE CHILD 
WELFARE SYSTEM, (2010), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_kinshi/f_kinshi.pdf 
(contrasting informal and formally recognized kinship caregivers); Laura Weinrib, Kinship Care 
Reform: A Proposal for Consent Legislation in Massachusetts, 87 MASS. L. REV. 23, 24 (2002) 
(describing the significance of informal kinship caregivers in Massachusetts and the legal 
impediments they face when caring for children outside the formal foster care system). 
79. See, e.g., Neil S. v. Mary L., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that 
biology is not determinative of parentage, and noting that California courts over the last three 
decades have placed increasing importance on the child’s social relationship with a prospective 
parent).  
80. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT. §§ 204(a)(5), 702 (amended 2002) (parentage may be established 
by holding a child out as one’s own for the first two years of the child’s life, regardless of biological 
relationship, and people who donate eggs or sperm for assisted reproduction are excluded as parents 
of a resulting child). 
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the law’s reach.81 Presumably, traditional surrogacy arrangements—
where the woman acting as surrogate is also the biological parent of the 
child she carries—would fall outside the law’s protections and would 
end up, if contested, in family court proceedings where the law does not 
well fit the circumstances.82 The preference for gestational surrogacy 
enforces the social perception of the importance of having (or, in the 
case of the pregnant woman, not having) a genetic tie to one’s child. 
This social perception is inaccurate, though, at least far as Western 
women acting as surrogates are concerned: women who engage in 
traditional surrogacy arrangements generally report the same levels of 
comfort in going through with the surrogacy and relinquishing the baby 
to the intended parents as do gestational surrogates.83 
Moreover, if the preferred feminist claim is that genetics does not 
make a parent, that has ramifications for whether the law should allow or 
prohibit “traditional” surrogacy—a surrogacy arrangement where the 
woman acting as surrogate contributes her own ova to the conception of 
the pregnancy.84 Traditional surrogacy (the process used in the Baby M 
case, for example) is less common now—in part because it is not legally 
supported in some of the jurisdictions that allow surrogacy contracts.85 
However, it may carry fewer health risks for the woman acting as 
surrogates because no in vitro process is typically involved.86 Moreover, 
women report that traditional surrogacy does not change their ability to 
go through with the contract and give the baby to the intended parents.87 
From this perspective, traditional surrogacy may be preferable for 
81. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 1 (West 2012). 
82. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights Law, 18 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 373 (2012) (“Pre-existing family law is inadequate to address 
surrogacy, in part because of the multiple parents . . . .”).  
83. See, e.g., Olga van den Akker, Psychological Trait and State Characteristics, Social Support 
and Attitudes to the Surrogate Pregnancy and Baby, 22 HUM. REPROD. 2287, 2293–94 (2007); 
Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1261 (while arguing that gestational surrogacy is preferable because 
the women acting as gestational surrogates place importance on the lack of genetic tie as a way to 
distance themselves from their pregnancies and avoid bonding with the baby after birth, noting that 
“[t]oo much should not be made of the difference between gestational and traditional surrogacy as 
traditional surrogates also attest to being able to detach from the babies by focusing on the 
importance of social parenthood.”). This comfort was also reflected in my discussions with women 
acting as surrogates in Idaho and Oregon.  
84. See Julie Shapiro, For Feminists Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key 
Question?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1345, 1346 n.7 (2014). 
85. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 5. 
86. Dominique Ladomato, Protecting Traditional Surrogacy Contracting Through Fee Payment 
Regulation, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 245, 248 n.22 (2012). 
87. See van den Akker, supra note 83. 
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women acting as surrogates—both to advance the principle that genetics 
does not make a parent, and to support women’s health.88 
C. Health, Access to Health Care, and Reproductive Technologies 
Viewed through a health lens, surrogacy raises additional challenges 
for creating a progressive, equitable framework for the practice. Assisted 
reproduction in the United States is a highly medicalized affair. This is, 
in part, a necessity—when undergoing ovum extraction, for example, a 
woman must take medication that stimulates the production of ova, and 
then have the resulting eggs extracted by a physician through an invasive 
procedure.89 Insemination with donor sperm, too, may take place in the 
medical setting, although people do not always require physician 
assistance to successfully conceive through insemination.90 However, 
some states’ parentage laws require physician involvement to exclude a 
sperm donor as a legal parent.91 In any event, although people certainly 
assist each other in conceiving children outside of the medical context, 
the health care system is the primary provider of assisted reproduction in 
the United States.92 
This health care system remains profoundly inequitable, despite the 
gains of the Affordable Care Act. For many people struggling to 
conceive children, the options are extremely limited. This is particularly 
true in the context of assisted reproduction. Most people in the United 
States lack insurance coverage for infertility treatments,93 and it is 
unclear whether the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will improve or further 
88. See Shapiro, supra note 84. 
89. See Fact Sheet: Egg Donation, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. (2012), 
http://www.reproductivefacts.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact
_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/Egg%20donation%20FINAL%204-23-12.pdf. 
90. I found no scientific studies on success rates of at-home artificial insemination, but there are a 
number of written and online materials describing how to perform the various methods of at-home 
insemination. See, e.g., CYNTHIA FEAKANS & DEB COHAN, BAY AREA PERINATAL AIDS CTR., 
HOME INSEMINATION: A SAFER WAY TO GET PREGNANT (2011), available at http://hiv.ucsf.edu/ 
care/perinatal/forpatients/HomeinseminationforHIVfemalediscordantcouple.pdf (advocating for 
home insemination, and explaining how it’s done, for HIV positive women who want to get 
pregnant without exposing an HIV negative male partner to unsafe sex). 
91. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17–44 (West 2013). 
92.  See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A 
GUIDE FOR PATIENTS (2011), available at https://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/ 
Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/ART.pdf (describing the complex—
and highly medical—procedures of assisted reproductive technologies, including in vitro 
fertilization). 
93. Kate Devine et al., The Affordable Care Act: Early Implications for Fertility Medicine, 101 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1224, 1224 (2014). 
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limit access to assisted reproductive medicine.94 The cost of surrogacy—
from $60,000 to upwards of $120,00095—is out of reach for most people 
in the United States, rendering surrogacy a reproductive option only for 
people with means.96 
But when considering whether to improve access to this procreative 
option, the considerably different rates of premature birth, maternal 
health complications, stillbirth, and other pregnancy outcomes for 
women of color97 should give feminists pause. Women’s rights activists 
have worked hard to improve health care access, supported universal 
healthcare, continued to work to use the ACA to expand access to 
women’s health,98 undertaken a campaign to repeal federal and state 
abortion funding restrictions,99 and struggled to make contraception 
available to and safe for women and girls. Health care disparities remain, 
however, a critical concern for low-income communities and people of 
color.100 In one of the most glaring and unjust examples, immigrants’ 
94. Id.  
95. See Mike Anderson, Surrogacy Financing: How to Afford that $60K Price Tag, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Oct. 23, 2013), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2013/10/21/ 
surrogacy-financing-how-to-afford-that-60k-price-tag. 
96. This is true of infertility services generally; as Pamela Bridgewater explains, African 
American and Latina women are less likely to be consumers of assisted reproductive technologies, 
“as are poor people and people with less than a high school education.” Pamela D. Bridgewater, 
Reconstructing Rationality: Towards a Critical Economic Theory of Reproduction, 56 EMORY L.J. 
1215, 1225 (2007). However, prominent African American women have had children through 
surrogacy arrangements, most recently professor and MSNBC host Melissa Harris-Perry. Janna 
Zinzi, How Melissa Harris-Perry Is Sparking a National Conversation About Fertility and Family, 
RH REALITY CHECK (Mar. 18, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/03/18/melissa-harris-
perry-sparking-national-conversation-fertility-family/. 
97. See AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CRISIS IN THE USA, ONE-
YEAR UPDATE 3, 19 (2011), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ 
deadlydelivery.pdf [hereinafter DEADLY DELIVERY] (noting maternal mortality rate for African 
American women in the United States is three to four times that of white women at comparable 
socio-economic levels); INST. OF MED., REPORT BRIEF: PRETERM BIRTH, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND PREVENTION, (2006), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2006/ 
Preterm-Birth-Causes-Consequences-and-Prevention/Preterm%20Birth%202006%20Report% 
20Brief.pdf (noting there are “very troubling and persistent” disparities in pre-term birth, 
particularly for African American and Latina women). 
98. See, e.g., RAISING WOMEN’S VOICES FOR THE HEALTH CARE WE NEED, 
http://www.raisingwomensvoices.net/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). That work was undermined, but 
not ended, by the Supreme Court’s decision holding that closely-held for-profit companies have 
religious rights under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act that permit them to refuse to 
follow the minimum essential coverage mandate that includes birth control. See Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., __ U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
99. See ALL ABOVE ALL, http://allaboveall.org/home/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
100. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CDC Health Disparities and 
Inequalities Report — United States, 2013 (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ 
other/su6203.pdf. 
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access to public medical assistance programs and the health care 
exchanges created by the ACA is limited because of a five-year bar on 
access to health benefits for lawful permanent residents, and the flat 
denial of health care to undocumented people.101 
Health care disparities are not limited, however, to people who lack 
health insurance. African American and Native American women, for 
example, regardless of education or affluence, have significantly worse 
maternal and pregnancy outcomes than their white counterparts.102 And 
all women in the United States have worse outcomes than women in 
forty-nine countries, including nearly every European country, Canada, 
and several countries in Asia and the Middle East.103 As Sheila 
Capestany has persuasively argued, we should strive to achieve 
European standards for all people in the United States, rather than rush 
to reach “equity” among our rather low United States rates.104 With 
serious health care disparities and limited access to basic health care as a 
backdrop, expanding access to surrogacy as the means of procreation is 
unlikely to be a priority for women’s health advocates. 
Another important question for women’s health advocates is whether 
a woman acting as surrogate puts her health at risk in the process. 
Pregnancy is always a risky endeavor. Short of death, pregnant women 
face risks to their health such as gestational diabetes, high blood 
pressure, childbirth complications and injuries, and more.105 Even an 
otherwise healthy and uneventful pregnancy may affect a woman’s long-
term physical health. But in addition to those risks, women who act as 
gestational surrogates typically go through an invasive in vitro medical 
process. There are short-term risks to such procedures, and potentially 
long-term risks as well, although those risks are not yet well understood 
because of the relatively recent availability of in vitro fertilization 
procedures.106 
In short, surrogacy arrangements implicate health care, as well as law 
and policy. Questions of access, exclusion, and individual long-term 
101. See Immigrants and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CENTER (Jan. 
2014), http://www.nilc.org/immigrantshcr.html. 
102. See DEADLY DELIVERY, supra note 97, at 19. 
103. Id. at 3. 
104. Sheila Capestany, Remarks at Northwest Reproductive Justice Collaborative: Birthing and 
Parenting in Prison: A Community Discussion (Dec. 8, 2009).  
105. See Pregnancy Complications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregcomplications.htm (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2014). 
106. Stark, supra note 82. 
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reproductive health inform the feminist understanding of surrogacy, and 
add to the complexity of the issue, particularly in a society where health 
care is not recognized as a human right and access to reproductive health 
care is, for many, threatened or out of reach. 
D. Bringing More Voices to the Debate: People with Disabilities 
Like people who lack access to health care in the United States, 
people with disabilities, too, are affected by the surrogacy discussion but 
are rarely at the forefront of the debate. Questions of assisted 
reproductive technology deeply affect people with disabilities, as their 
rights to procreate,107 to participate in surrogacy,108 and to be valued as 
full human beings109 have long been questioned. Discussions about 
surrogacy typically do not envision people with disabilities as either 
intended parents or as women acting as surrogates, but as fetuses or 
newborn babies whose existence will challenge the parameters of the 
surrogacy agreement.110 The primary question seems to be, what should 
happen when a pregnant woman acting as a surrogate receives a prenatal 
diagnosis that the fetus has a medical condition that may cause it to be 
107. For decades in the United States, people with disabilities, poor people, and people of color 
(especially welfare recipients and Native American women) were subjected to forced sterilization 
under eugenics policy. Although those policies have been repudiated, see Ainsworth & Roth, supra 
note 38, people with disabilities are still sterilized by court order. See, e.g., Conservatorship of 
Angela D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). On a different note, others argue that people 
struggling with infertility are also suffering from a disability, and should have a right to assisted 
reproductive technologies, including surrogacy. See Lindsey Coffey, A Rights-Based Claim to 
Surrogacy: Article 23 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 20 MICH. ST. 
INT’L. L. REV. 259, 291 (2012). 
108. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(4), (b)(3) (West 2012) (requiring both women 
acting as surrogates and intended parents to complete a mental health evaluation to establish 
eligibility to participate in a legally recognized surrogacy contract). The law is silent, however, as to 
what happens when a mental health evaluation indicates that a party may have a disability; perhaps 
the assumption is that the market will resolve the issue, and that people will not contract with each 
other under those circumstances. If that is so, that assessment is laden with the view that disability 
renders people unfit for procreation. 
109. Generations Ahead, A Reproductive Justice Analysis of Genetic Technologies: Report on a 
National Convening of Women of Color and Indigenous Women 8–9 (2009), http://www.generations-
ahead.org/files-for-download/articles/GenAheadReport_ReproductiveJustice.pdf; Mia Mingus, Disabled 
Women and Reproductive Justice, THE PRO-CHOICE PUBLIC EDUCATION PROJECT, 
http://protectchoice.org/article.php?id=140 (last visited Aug. 13, 2014) (noting that in United States 
culture, disability is frequently “feared, hated, and typically regarded as a condition that reduces the 
value of disabled people”). 
110. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN HEALTH (Mar. 
6, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-helly-legal-battle/; Hilary 
Whiteman, Surrogate Mom Vows to Take Care of Ill Twin “Abandoned” by Parents, CNN WORLD 
(Aug. 7, 2014, 12:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/04/world/asia/thailand-australia-surrogacy/. 
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born with a disability? 
Other reproductive technologies, such as pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis, or PGD, allow prospective parents and their health care 
providers to control for certain genetic attributes in fertilized embryos 
before they are implanted in a woman’s uterus. Ethicists and the media 
have raised concerns regarding “designer babies,” suggesting the 
possibility that parents could predetermine the height, eye color, and 
other traits of their children.111 But less frequently challenged is the 
rhetoric that equates disability with reduced human value, rhetoric that is 
pervasive in both surrogacy and abortion debates.112 
Feminists are also at fault for this dehumanizing treatment of 
disability, particularly in the abortion context, as Alison Piepmeier 
demonstrates in her article, Disability and What’s Wrong with Feminist 
Framings of Reproduction.113 After posting an article about having a 
child with Down Syndrome on a New York Times blog, Ms. Piepmeier 
received numerous comments from readers that equated giving birth to a 
child with Down Syndrome (or any disability) with a “crime,” a “drain 
on society,” and cruelty.114 As Sujatha Jesudason and Julia Epstein 
explain, abortion rights proponents “sometimes use disability to defend 
access to abortion,” using rhetoric that inevitably equates disability with 
tragedy.115 
Cases where the parties to a surrogate contract receive a prenatal 
diagnosis of disability have led to conflict and media attention.116 A host 
of questions follow: should the intended parents be permitted to force 
the woman acting as surrogate to have an abortion if a prenatal diagnosis 
shows that the child may be born with a disability, such as Down 
Syndrome? May the intended parents refuse to follow through with the 
contract? Will the woman acting as surrogate become the legal parent if 
the intended parents refuse to fulfill the contract, and if so, will the 
intended parents be legally obligated to support the child financially? 
The answers to these questions have, unfortunately, rarely been 
111. See, e.g., Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
897 (2007). 
112. See Sujatha Jesudason & Julia Epstein, Disability and Justice in Abortion Debates, CENTER 
FOR WOMEN’S POLICY STUDIES (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.centerwomenpolicy.org/news/ 
newsletter/documents/REPRO_DisabilityandJusticeinAbortionDebates_JesudasonandEpstein.pdf. 
113. Alison Piepmeier, Disability and What’s Wrong with Feminist Framings of Reproduction, 
39 FEMINIST STUD. 159 (2013). 
114. Id. at 160. 
115. Jesudason & Epstein, supra note 112. 
116. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 110. 
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framed in a way that honors the humanity of people with disabilities. A 
woman’s right to self-determination is a feminist imperative, but so 
should be the dignity of people with disabilities, whose lives should not 
be used as a rhetorical device or a justification for surrogacy policy. 
Marsha Saxton’s claim about the abortion context is apropos here as 
well: “[T]he great opportunity with this issue is to think and act and take 
leadership in the place where feminism, disability rights, and human 
liberation meet.”117 
II. PEOPLE WHO PARTICIPATE IN SURROGACY 
CONTRACTS: WHAT WE KNOW 
In the decades since Baby M was decided, surrogacy arrangements in 
the United States and between United States intended parents and 
women in countries like India have become far more common. Much 
more is known, now, about the demographics of the women who act as 
surrogates and the people who become intended parents.118 As 
scholars—most notably Canadian scholars Karen Busby and Delaney 
Vun—have summarized this knowledge elsewhere,119 this section will 
briefly review the empirical information. While a detailed recounting is 
not necessary here, an overview is included because feminist theory and 
reproductive justice intentionally engage with people’s experiences to 
inform a policy response. 
A. Women Acting as Surrogates 
Women acting as surrogates in the United States tend to be white, of 
varying income, and define themselves as Christian.120 Media in the 
United States have reported that a significant number of women acting 
as surrogates were married to men who are enlisted in the military, and 
act as surrogates while their husbands are deployed overseas.121 Women 
acting as surrogates are frequently motivated by altruism; they have 
117. Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
READER 231, 238 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008).  
118. There is also more information about the experiences of children born from surrogacy 
arrangements, although the data is still fairly limited. Detailed attention to the concerns of children 
born of surrogacy arrangements is beyond the scope of this Article. That is not to say that they are 
not important.  
119. See generally Busby & Vun, supra note 44. 
120. Id. at 42–44. 
121. See, e.g., Astrid Rodrigues and Jon Meyersohn, Military Wives Turn to Surrogacy: Labor of 
Love or Financial Boost?, ABC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Parenting/ 
military-wives-surrogates-carrying-babies-love-money/story?id=11882687. 
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consistently explained that they want to help someone who desperately 
wants to have children, and that they view surrogacy as an opportunity 
to do something meaningful with their lives.122 Some women act as 
surrogates for a close friend or relative, and in states like Washington, 
where compensated surrogacy is banned, women nonetheless decide to 
act as surrogates out of this sense of altruism.123 
In both United States and British studies, women acting as surrogates 
indicate that they appreciated the emotional bond with the intended 
parents—or were unhappy if that was lacking—and that they were 
comfortable, even happy, giving the baby to the intended parents after 
the birth.124 They describe feeling like this pregnancy is akin to caring 
for someone else’s child, unlike the bonding they experienced with 
pregnancies with children they intended to keep.125 This was true even 
when they were genetically related to the children they carried; the 
experience of Mary Beth Whitehead is not the norm. This is not a 
surprising finding given that the vast majority of women who have had 
abortions describe feelings of relief, rather than sorrow, after the 
termination of their pregnancies.126 These studies demonstrate that 
women experience a pregnancy differently depending on their intentions 
in relation to it. 
Legal disputes—at least those that end up in court—between women 
acting as surrogates and intended parents are apparently rare.127 
Although cases involving conflict receive significant media attention, 
there are relatively few reported decisions involving custody and/or 
contract disputes between parties to a surrogacy arrangement.128 When 
disputes do arise, they appear to happen when one party to the contract 
feels the other has not met the expectations for emotional engagement—
122. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 53–56 (citing several studies of women in the United States 
and the U.K. that concluded that money was rarely, if ever, the primary motivating factor for 
women acting as surrogates). 
123. In a lovely example, that apparently confounds expectations about race, a woman acted as 
surrogate for her best friend, giving birth at home with her friend and their husbands, and 
documented by a photographer. See Melanie Monroe Rosen, Best Friend Becomes Surrogate 
Mother, PARENTING, http://www.parenting.com/gallery/surrogate-mother?page=14 (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2014). 
124. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 59–64; van den Akker, supra note 74, at 56. 
125. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 68–74. Two women I spoke to in Oregon and Idaho, who 
had each acted as surrogates more than once, also expressed this view.  
126. See Corinne H. Rocca et al., Women’s Emotions One Week After Receiving or Being Denied 
an Abortion in the United States, 49 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 122, 128 (2013). 
127. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 72–73. 
128. Id. at 36–38. 
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in short, United States surrogacy arrangements tend not to be arms-
length, commercial-style transactions, but more complicated, 
emotionally laden relationships.129 
B. Intended Parents 
The significant expense of surrogacy for the intended parents suggests 
that they may have more means than the women with whom they 
contract as surrogates.130 However, they are not necessarily wealthy.131 
Surrogacy will be more expensive for intended parents who live in a 
state that does not legally recognize surrogacy contracts, so presumably 
that prohibition acts as a barrier to people of lesser means utilizing 
surrogacy arrangements. Economic incentives encourage some intended 
parents to make surrogacy arrangements with women outside the United 
States, in countries like India, Mexico, and, until recently, Ukraine, 
where surrogacy is either explicitly legal or implicitly permitted.132 
Similarly, intended parents in other countries where surrogacy is 
outlawed contract with women in the United States to act as surrogates 
for them.133 
Intended parents tend to be straight couples who have been unable to 
conceive children and for whom other fertility interventions have 
failed.134 Even celebrity women typically tell the press that they were 
unable to conceive and turned to surrogacy for that reason, contrary to 
assumptions that they used surrogacy to avoid changes to their 
appearance.135 Intended parents are also, increasingly, gay male couples 
129. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 4, at 1232. 
130. See, e.g., Melissa Dahl, More Couples, Like Jimmy Fallon and His Wife, Turning to 
Surrogacy, TODAY (Aug. 9, 2013, 8:26 PM), http://www.today.com/health/more-couples-jimmy-
fallon-his-wife-turning-surrogacy-6C10885863 (noting the high cost of surrogacy that tends to 
make it a privilege of the wealthy, while describing two stories involving intended parents who 
borrowed significant amounts of money to pay for the surrogacy arrangement); see also Deborah L. 
Cohen, Surrogate Pregnancies on Rise Despite Cost Hurdles, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2013, 5:40 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-parent-surrogate-idUSBRE92H11Q20130318. 
131. Dahl, supra note 130. 
132. Jennifer Kirby, These Two Americans Want Babies Through Indian Surrogates. It’s Not 
Been Easy., NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115873/fertility-
tourism-seeking-surrogacy-india-thailand-mexico. 
133. Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2014, at 
A1. 
134. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 79. 
135. As Busby and Vun explain, “[s]ome are concerned that commercial surrogacy . . . allows 
wealthy women to buy their way out of the burden of having to be pregnant.” Id. at 79. But the 
research on surrogacy (and, in the case of celebrities, their reports), seems to belie that notion. See, 
e.g., Summer Buesing, 18 Celebrities Who Used Surrogacy, THE RICHEST (June 7, 2014), 
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who contribute one partner’s sperm and use a donor egg (a misnomer, as 
egg donors are usually compensated in the United States) to create a pre-
zygote, then contract with a woman acting as surrogate to carry the 
pregnancy.136 Single people may also engage in surrogacy 
arrangements.137 
C. The Problem of Brokers 
Although the Internet has allowed for the greater possibility that 
intended parents and surrogates can meet and make arrangements 
directly without third party involvement, many find each other through 
brokers.138 These third parties range from individuals such as former 
surrogate mothers or lawyers to fertility clinics or stand-alone 
agencies.139 The use of third party agencies in this setting can be 
analogized to adoption agencies, but a primary distinction is that 
adoption agencies are highly regulated entities, whereas surrogacy 
brokers operate almost universally free of oversight.140 
This lack of regulation has, unfortunately, allowed unscrupulous 
brokers to victimize both intended parents and women acting as 
surrogates.141 In an infamous example, SurroGenesis, a surrogacy 
agency in California, absconded with up to two million dollars from 
intended parents, leaving numerous women in the middle of pregnancies 
without health insurance, and the intended parents having lost all the 
money they had believed would be used for the pregnant woman’s care 
and fulfillment of their part of the surrogacy contract.142 
http://www.therichest.com/expensive-lifestyle/lifestyle/18-celebrities-who-used-surrogacy/. 
136. See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 17. 
137. See, e.g., Lisa Flam, Yearning to Be Parent, Dad Is One of Few Single Men Who Turned to 
Surrogacy, TODAY (July 26, 2013, 9:47 AM), http://www.today.com/parents/yearning-be-parent-
dad-one-few-single-men-who-turned-6C10744873. 
138. It appears that third parties brokered surrogacy arrangements from the beginning. See Carol 
Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
67, 83–85 (2007) (telling the story of attorney Noel Keane, who brokered the arrangement between 
Mary Beth Whitehead and the Sterns, and who became the “go-to guy” for people wanting to make 
surrogacy arrangements in the northeast). 
139. See Tamar Lewin, A Surrogacy Agency That Delivered Heartache, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 
2014, at A1. 
140. California is the one exception. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7691 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) 
(regulating non-lawyer “surrogacy facilitators” by requiring funds intended for a surrogacy 
agreement to be placed in escrow or in an attorney’s trust account, and distributed by either an 
attorney or the escrow agent). 
141. See Lewin, supra note 139. 
142. Stephanie Saul, Would-Be Parents Find Surrogacy Agency Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2009, at A14. 
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The reality of people’s experiences with surrogacy, and the potential 
for problems inherent in such a fraught context, calls for regulation to 
protect the humanity of those involved. Regulation in this setting is 
bound to be less helpful if it is ad hoc. Rather, a regulatory response to 
compensated surrogacy should be based on a comprehensive, if 
necessarily contingent, plan to further principles of gender equality, 
social justice, and anti-subordination. 
III. PROGRESSIVE, FEMINIST PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATING 
SURROGACY 
Because there is no one school of feminist thought, I take the liberty 
of referring to the principles described below as “feminist,” knowing 
that some will object to this framing. But a project that seeks to ensure 
the anti-subordination of women surely fits within at least one school of 
feminist thought. “Feminist” is, in this case, qualified by “progressive” 
because a progressive vision includes both human rights to dignity and 
self-determination, and a recognition that the state has a role in ensuring 
the realization of those rights.143 With that said, some will object that as 
an economic exchange, compensated surrogacy is simply an expression 
of capitalism and the reduction of all human endeavors, no matter how 
sacred, to a market transaction.144 This is where the “pragmatic” feminist 
approach comes in. 
Pragmatic feminism is described by Mary Becker as the recognition 
that no one “grand theory” can capture the possible manifestations of a 
particular problem or the efficacy of proposed solutions.145 Drawing 
from Margaret Radin’s work, Becker suggests that surrogacy is too 
complex to be resolved by feminist theories, such as dominance 
143. See Al Yates & Anne Bartley, Progressive Thinking: A Synthesis of American Progressive 
Values, Beliefs, and Positions, AM. VALUES PROJECT 1, 20 (2012), http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
131793272/Progressive-Thinking. 
144. See Barbara Katz Rothman, Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of Life, in 
EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 95, 96 (Elaine Hoffman Baruch et al. eds., 1988); 
Brandon McGinley, Why the Left Should Oppose Commercial Surrogacy, THE WEEK (Oct. 21, 
2014), http://theweek.com/article/index/270139/why-the-left-should-oppose-commercial-surrogacy 
(arguing that commercial surrogacy reduces women and babies to market commodities); Kathleen 
Parker, Op-Ed., Kathleen Parker: The Exploitation of Surrogate Mothers, WASH. POST (May 24, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kathleen-parker-the-exploitation-of-surrogate-
mothers/2013/05/24/90bc159e-c4b0-11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca_story.html (describing an interview 
with Kathleen Sloan, a feminist and board member of the National Organization for Women who 
opposes commercial surrogacy). 
145. Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical Approaches and the Double Bind of Surrogacy, 69 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303, 305 (1993).  
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feminism or hedonic feminism.146 A pragmatic feminist response to 
surrogacy would, instead, consider surrogacy and its real and potential 
impact on women, recognizing that women are not similarly situated, 
and “make a best guess,” continually reassessing the impact of a 
particular policy solution.147 
Described that way, pragmatic theory echoes anti-essentialism, which 
recognizes that people’s lives are formed, influenced by, and lived 
through multiple identities. As Angela P. Harris explains, both feminist 
and legal theory tend to employ “gender essentialism—the notion that a 
unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described 
independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of 
experience.”148 The result of gender essentialism is that the “essential” 
woman is invariably white, straight, cisgender, and not poor or an 
immigrant.149 When policy is made using a gender essentialist 
framework, experience teaches that the policy will not help—and may 
even harm—people who do not fit the essential image. 
There are multiple instances of failures of feminist lawmaking to 
address the experiences of women of color (and some refreshing 
examples of the opposite150). Kimberlé Crenshaw, in her influential 
essay in which she introduced intersectionality theory, explored the 
failure of the anti-domestic violence and anti-rape movements to involve 
the leadership of African American women and to consider their 
communities’ histories of law enforcement oppression.151 Many 
feminists, activists, and survivors of violence share Crenshaw’s critique 
in a growing movement to reconsider the criminal response to intimate 
partner violence.152 
146. Id. at 305. 
147. Id. at 309. 
148. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 
585 (1990). 
149. Id. 
150. In one recent example, advocates from the domestic violence, LGBTQ, immigrant, and 
tribal communities worked together to successfully demand that Congress reauthorize the Violence 
Against Women Act in 2013. Advocates did not give in to Congressional pressure to agree to 
reauthorization without critical new protections for immigrants, LGBTQ survivors of intimate 
partner violence, and increased recognition of tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., Violence Against Women 
Act Reauthorization, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. , https://immigrantjustice.org/ 
VAWAreauthorization (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
151. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY 
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 357 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
152. See, e.g., BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S 
PRISON NATION (2012); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2012). 
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The reproductive justice movement offers a similar anti-essentialist 
critique of reproductive rights activism and the “pro-choice” movement. 
Drawing from anti-essentialism and intersectionality theory, 
reproductive justice understands that people’s lives are informed by 
multiple identities and affected by multiple oppressions that impact their 
ability to make reproductive decisions, ensure their health, and parent 
the children they have.153 Reproductive justice acknowledges that 
circumstances like mass incarceration, legacies of colonialism, and 
poverty limit the life chances of people and undermine the power of their 
communities, rendering “choice” frequently meaningless.154 Movement 
leaders argue that the best way to ensure reproductive justice is to seek 
and support the leadership of the people who are most affected by social 
policy or practice, especially those most likely to be harmed by those 
practices.155 
Considering surrogacy through an anti-essentialist, reproductive 
justice lens requires, then, looking to the communities who are most 
affected by the practice of surrogacy, and those who are most vulnerable 
within it. One of the challenges of supporting the involvement of people 
affected in this setting is that the women acting as surrogates, who are 
most likely to face the possibility of economic exploitation, are not an 
organized or even easily identifiable group. Indeed, in Washington State, 
compensated surrogacy has been banned for almost thirty years, so there 
are either no women or no women willing to risk a misdemeanor who 
could share their experiences of acting as a surrogate for money.156 
Given that challenge, Legal Voice reached out to individual women 
acting as surrogates in other states, sought the guidance of reproductive 
justice organizations, and evaluated the available empirical evidence 
regarding women’s experiences of surrogacy—including the experiences 
of women from other countries acting as surrogates for United States 
couples. This is not the only strategy, and ideally much more work will 
153. JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 4–5 (2004). 
154. Id. 
155. See, e.g., Elena R. Gutierrez, “We Will No Longer Be Silent or Invisible”: Latinas 
Organizing for Reproductive Justice, in UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 215, 216–32 (2004). 
156. It is not surprising then that in Washington State, intended parents (who contracted with an 
out-of-state woman to act as a surrogate) and others—but not women acting as surrogates—testified 
in support of proposed surrogacy legislation in Washington State in 2011. Senate Bill Report, 
Engrossed 2d Substitute H.R. 1267, Reg. Sess., at 4 (Wash. 2011), available at 
https://app.leg.wa.gov/CMD/Handler.ashx?MethodName=getdocumentcontent&documentId=k57G
43OgWwM&att=false. 
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be done to consider the voices of women of color, transgender people, 
people with disabilities, low-income people, and others affected by the 
surrogacy debate. But what we learned was valuable in guiding our 
response to proposed surrogacy legislation, in that it clarified for us that, 
whatever the feminist debate over surrogacy, the practice is currently 
happening and its unregulated state is what is harmful right now. And 
additional potential harm will be borne by those with the least economic 
resources and the least power—including women in other countries, 
where legal protections for women acting as surrogates may be 
insufficient to ensure their health, dignity, and safety. 
Unlike sex work and drug use, where criminalization itself is actively 
and deeply harmful,157 state bans on compensated surrogacy have not led 
to the mass surveillance and imprisonment of intended parents or 
surrogates. But that does not mean that we should not advocate for 
decriminalization and regulation. The potential harms of surrogacy are 
real, and we can address these harms—both current and predictable—by 
crafting responsive, progressive legislation. 
But, as pragmatic feminism teaches, we may not be able to determine 
how each part of our suggested approach will ultimately affect people. 
Thus, part of my proposal is that feminists own this issue in the 
legislative arena, not just for the first attempt at regulation but through 
implementation and the inevitable changes needed to address the ways 
that surrogacy may be, or become, problematic. Angela Harris’ critique 
of essentialism offers a guide for considering an appropriate legislative 
response to surrogacy: “My suggestion is only that we make our 
categories explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable, and that to do so 
is all the more important in a discipline like law, where abstraction and 
‘frozen’ categories are the norm.”158 Like the categories of identity 
Harris explores, the feminist response to assisted reproductive 
technologies must be long-term, engaged, “tentative,” and ever 
thoughtful of reproductive justice. 
Using these principles, Legal Voice determined that the ban on 
compensated surrogacy in Washington State is actually harmful, because 
it encourages intended parents in this state to go to other states or other 
countries. This would not necessarily pose risks if those other states or 
nations had robust laws that ensured the humanity and autonomy of 
women acting as surrogates. But that is simply not the case. In Illinois, 
157. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
§ 1:1 (2014). 
158. Harris, supra note 148, at 586. 
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for example, surrogacy regulation is more progressive in the sense that it 
does not exclude same sex couples.159 Yet, it allows for the enforcement 
of contract provisions that restrict a pregnant woman’s medical decision-
making as well as life choices during her pregnancy.160 
The liberal feminist may argue that the woman who contracts away 
these rights does so knowingly, and should be respected in her decision 
to do so.161 But there is no principled way to permit intended parents in a 
surrogacy arrangement to make the abortion decision, for example, but 
to deny that same “dominion” to a husband or male partner who is the 
genetic father of the baby a woman carries.162 Further, it is the state 
enforcement of such contract terms that create for pregnant women a 
second-class status. 
Second-class status is precisely the concern reflected in India, where 
intended parents from the Global North hire women to carry their babies. 
India’s legislative policy encourages these transactions and by doing so 
has generated a billion dollar industry. The way these transactions are 
encouraged, however, is by making them attractive to potential intended 
parents. Part of that attractiveness has to do with the way the law and 
practice permit remuneration and legal recognition, without regulating 
the practices that undermine women’s liberty or dealing seriously in any 
way with the power disparities inherent in these transactions. 
Given the reality of this situation, Legal Voice determined that it is 
preferable to regulate surrogacy in Washington State, encouraging 
people to engage in these transactions locally, under a robust regulatory 
scheme. This does not undermine the primary focuses of feminist, 
progressive work: creating the conditions for reproductive justice for all 
people, addressing economic exclusion, eradicating state and individual 
gender-based violence, and more. Rather, local regulation of surrogacy 
recognizes that assisted reproductive technologies are a modern reality, 
with ongoing complexities that have important implications for women. 
Legal Voice determined that local regulation should be informed by a 
set of principles, based in pragmatic and anti-essentialist feminism. The 
principles guiding such regulation are humanity, equality of power, 
159. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(b) (West 2012). 
160. Id. 47 / 25(d)(2). 
161. See, e.g., Erin Matson, Is Preventing Surrogacy Feminist? No, It’s Anti-Choice, RH 
REALITY CHECK (Apr. 11, 2014 4:56 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/04/11/preventing-
surrogacy-feminist-anti-choice/. 
162. As Justice O’Connor eloquently explained when striking down Pennsylvania’s spousal 
notification requirement for abortion, “[a] State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over 
his wife that parents exercise over their children.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 898 (1992). 
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reproductive autonomy and health, non-discrimination, clarity, and 
justice. I will describe each principle below, then return to each principle 
in the section that follows, applying each to surrogacy regulation. 
A. Humanity 
A primary feminist objection to commercial surrogacy is that by 
commodifying reproduction, such transactions reduce women’s bodies 
to mere vessels.163 Surrogacy regulation should ensure, within the 
context of the compensated transaction, the human dignity of all its 
participants. The challenge is moving this principle from semantics, in a 
world that remains highly stratified by race, class, and yes, gender, to a 
meaningful legislative principle. Moreover, claiming such humanity 
does not necessarily address the arguments of feminists who would ban 
or discourage surrogacy. Again, the point is not to answer the critiques 
and resolve them, but as pragmatists, to recognize that surrogacy 
arrangements are a reality with which we must engage if we are to 
ensure the humanity of the people who bring children into the world 
through surrogacy. 
B. Equality of Power 
The commodification concern is echoed in the exploitation concern: 
that women, especially women of color, who still earn lower wages than 
men for comparable work in the United States,164 and whose earning 
power has been increasingly depressed by, among other things, this pay 
gap and wealth inequality,165 are more vulnerable to economic pressures. 
The fear is that women in these circumstances will decide to engage in 
surrogacy because of those pressures, making a decision they would not 
otherwise have made given different options. One way to address this 
through a regulatory framework is to attempt, as far as possible, to craft 
provisions that elevate the power of the woman acting as surrogate, so 
that she and the intended parents approach each other on equal footing. 
The hope is that this equality of power in such agreements will help 
avert the risks of coercion once the agreement is entered into. Again, like 
163. See Rothman, supra note 27, at 1246. 
164. See Eileen Patten, On Equal Pay Day, Key Facts About the Gender Pay Gap, PEW RES. 
CENTER (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/08/on-equal-pay-day-
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-gender-pay-gap/. 
165. Lifting as We Climb: Women of Color, Wealth, and America’s Future, INSIGHT CENTER FOR 
ECON. DEV., at 2 (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.insightcced.org/uploads/CRWG/LiftingAsWeClimb-
ExecutiveSummary-embargoed-0303.pdf. 
 
                                                     
05 - Ainsworth_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014  6:28 PM 
1110 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1077 
the humanity principle, equalizing power within the contract does not 
answer the critique that the relationship itself is exploitive, but under a 
pragmatic approach, we are not required to resolve that question in order 
to address the reality of the complexity of these relationships. 
C. Reproductive Autonomy and Health 
The principle that the woman acting as surrogate retains her 
constitutional and human rights to medical decision-making, 
reproductive decisions, and control over her daily life regardless of 
whether she is pregnant serves the first two principles. It may be 
interesting, in the abstract, to argue over whether a person can contract 
away their constitutional rights,166 but public policy should not 
countenance state enforcement of agreements that undermine the 
personhood of pregnant women. To do so would simply increase the 
already alarming state interventions in pregnant women’s lives in the 
United States and affirm the legality of state surveillance and policing of 
pregnant women. And, as experience teaches, these agreements would 
surely be more readily enforced against women of color.167 Reproductive 
health and decision-making for women, especially low-income women, 
women of color, immigrant women, women with disabilities, and 
transgender people, are already compromised by numerous state and 
federal policies.168 A key feminist project, informed by principles of 
reproductive justice, is to fight those compromises. Thus, no legislation, 
in any context, should undermine reproductive autonomy or further 
threaten reproductive health. 
This does not mean, however, that feminists should encourage or 
continue to engage in dialogue about surrogacy in relation to abortion by 
relying on disability as an argument for abortion rights. As demonstrated 
above, such reliance is demeaning and dehumanizing to people living 
with disabilities, and it adds to a public dialogue that wrongly teaches 
that people with disabilities lead tragic, difficult lives.169 Rather, feminist 
law reformers should consider how regulation may discriminate against 
166. Richard Epstein argued for enforcement, for example, of surrogacy contract provisions 
providing the intended father the authority to make the abortion decision: “allowing the surrogate to 
carry the child to term against the wishes of its father is inconsistent with the basic contractual 
design.” Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2305, 2336 (1995). 
167. See ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 246–93; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 37. 
168. See generally SILLIMAN ET AL., supra note 153; Sneha Barot, Governmental Coercion in 
Reproductive Decision Making: See It Both Ways, 15 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 7 (2012). 
169. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 117. 
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or even deny the existence of people with disabilities. 
D. Non-Discrimination 
A law that defines the validity of a surrogacy contract will likely 
discriminate between people by defining some as capable of being a 
party to a surrogacy agreement and others incapable, as is typical in both 
contract law (minors, for example, are not generally considered legally 
competent to contract)170 and family law (again, minors, although they 
do become parents, are frequently restricted from legal marriage until 
they reach a certain age).171 This kind of discrimination between persons 
may serve valid, even feminist, public policy goals, including protecting 
young children from early marriage or from economic exploitation. 
But, all too often in the United States, laws delineate the 
circumstances under which a person is recognized as a parent in a 
harmful, irrational, discriminatory manner. In some jurisdictions, despite 
the significant legal gains of recent years, lesbian and gay parents are 
still denied the right to adopt children or to engage in otherwise legally 
recognized surrogacy contracts.172 Moreover, as discussed previously, 
people with disabilities are too often seen as incapable of parenting, and 
so surrogacy contracts require mental health evaluations, which may be 
used for the purpose of denying some people the ability to participate in 
such contracts.173 
A feminist principle of anti-discrimination in this setting would look 
carefully at any exclusions from participation in surrogacy and consider 
whether the exclusion either serves or undermines equality and anti-
subordination. Those that undermine or further serve to subordinate 
groups of people should be eliminated from a regulatory scheme.174 
170. For a succinct overview of the development of the jurisprudence of minors’ decision-making 
and contractual rights, see Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding 
to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law’s View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY 
L.J. 65, 91 (1999). 
171. See Hannah Cartwright, Legal Age of Consent for Marriage and Sex for the 50 United 
States, GLOBAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Aug. 21, 2011), http://globaljusticeinitiative.files.wordpress.com/ 
2011/12/united-states-age-of-consent-table11.pdf. 
172. Nicolas, supra note 17. 
173. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(4), (b)(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013). 
174. The question of whether children should have rights to contract or other rights legally co-
extensive with adults is another complicated question and worthy of much more discussion than I 
have space in this Article. The question of age restrictions in surrogacy arrangements is, in my view, 
less complicated than the question of age restrictions on voting, speech in the public school setting, 
and medical decision-making, where there are strong arguments in favor of eliminating such 
restrictions. 
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E. Clarity 
Clarity is probably the most mundane of the principles addressed 
here, but when achieved it too serves the other principles. Unambiguous 
rules ensure that people understand precisely what they stand to gain or 
lose when engaging in surrogacy agreements. Lack of legal clarity also 
opens judicial-decision making to the influence of bias—and, in the 
surrogacy context, that bias may reflect antiquated views of women and 
motherhood. In the Baby M case, for example, it is understandable that 
the trial court, without legislative guidance, struggled to determine how 
to apply the law to this set of circumstances. Yet, it appears that the trial 
court based much of its analysis on whether or not Mary Beth Whitehead 
would be as good a parent as the Sterns, and drew on offensive 
stereotypes in drawing its conclusions.175 Thus, clarity for its own sake 
may serve a social good in the setting of surrogacy, hopefully preventing 
the breakdown of relationships between the intended parents and the 
woman acting as surrogate, and minimizing judicial bias when courts are 
called upon to resolve disputes. 
F. Justice 
Finally, justice—the true meaning of which is a debate beyond the 
scope of this Article176—should be an overarching principle that guides 
the development of surrogacy legislation. In many ways, it is the 
principle that urges feminist engagement with surrogacy regulation in 
the first place, as it is unfair treatment of people, especially women 
acting as surrogates, that counsels a legislative response. 
IV. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES TO SURROGACY 
LEGISLATION 
The principles identified above help guide advocacy for a regulatory 
response to surrogacy; in the paragraphs that follow, I revisit each 
principle and suggest its application to compensated surrogacy 
regulation. Of course, like all guidelines, they suggest rather than direct, 
and sometimes raise more questions than they answer. Thus, the 
recommendations set out below should be viewed as a starting point for 
an ongoing, robust, inclusive dialogue—including but not limited to 
175. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1259–60 (N.J. 1988) (noting that the trial court and experts 
“harshly judged” Ms. Whitehead). 
176. See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO (2010).  
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academic discourse—about surrogacy regulation. 
A. Humanity 
One seemingly simple proposition for ensuring people’s humanity is 
to change the way we talk about human beings. From reclaiming racial 
and gender slurs to movements naming and defining themselves, there is 
significant understanding that humanizing language is progress.177 It 
may not help resolve a conflict in court, but, on the other hand, having to 
use statutory language that honors people’s humanity may, arguably, 
have an influence on judicial decision-making.178 To that end, Legal 
Voice recommended, and the legislative sponsor of Washington State’s 
legislation accepted, replacing the terms surrogate, gestational surrogate, 
etc., with “woman acting as surrogate.”179 This mouthful of words may 
lack elegance, but it brings to the foreground the human being who is at 
the center of this transaction. With this as our starting point, humanity 
(like justice) becomes an overarching goal when regulating surrogacy. 
B. Equality of Power 
The fear that most women acting as surrogates will be low-income 
women coerced by economic circumstances into acting as surrogates for 
the wealthy has not materialized in the United States.180 Nonetheless, 
economic power is typically skewed toward the intended parents in a 
surrogacy agreement. Thus, a way to minimize the possibility of such 
exploitation is to use the legal framework to create incentives for the 
parties to view each other as full human beings and to equalize power in 
these relationships. 
This is easier said than done through a legislative scheme (and is, 
surely, inadequate to address the economic disparities created by 
177. See, e.g., Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm: Injustice 
Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental Discourses, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 508, 508 
(2000) (explaining the use of framing as a social justice organizing tool in the context of 
environmental issues); see also Ashley Parker, Reclaiming the Words that Smear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
12, 2014, at SR5 (describing women in politics’ coopting gender-based slurs to advance their own 
agendas). 
178. A discussion of semiotics—the study of both linguistic and other signs and their structures 
and processes—is beyond the scope of this paper; for an example of the application of semiotics to 
law, see generally Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 
(2004). 
179. See H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(32) (Wash. 2011), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1267.pdf.  
180. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 22. 
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economic policy driving the dramatic income inequality181 in the United 
States). But some gains can be achieved by providing for redistribution 
in the form of the intended parents paying for independent legal counsel 
for the woman acting as surrogate, and paying for her health insurance 
and all costs of prenatal care and the woman’s health needs during 
pregnancy.182 Further, the knowledge on the part of the intended parents 
that the woman acting as surrogate will retain all health care decision-
making incentivizes them to treat the woman with respect, and to 
consider in advance whether they share similar values about pregnancy, 
childbirth, abortion, and long-term relationships between the intended 
parents, the child, and the woman acting as surrogate. 
C. Reproductive Autonomy and Women’s Health 
Ensuring that a woman retains reproductive decision-making should 
be a key aspect of any regulatory scheme regarding compensated 
surrogacy. Legislation should expressly hold void and unenforceable any 
contract provisions that purport to control a pregnant woman’s decisions 
during pregnancy—from her constitutionally protected decisions to the 
more mundane decisions of daily life, such as whether, when, and how 
to exercise, what to eat, and which doctor to see. Surrogacy contracts 
should not become another mechanism to undermine the health and 
rights of pregnant women. 
Surrogacy legislation is also an important place to reaffirm in state 
law the fundamental right to decide whether or not to continue a 
pregnancy. Affirmation of the abortion right expressly in the law—as 
included in the surrogacy regulation bill, House Bill 1267, proposed in 
Washington State in 2011183—gives clear guidance to courts, intended 
parents, and women acting as surrogates. Moreover, the law should not 
be a vehicle for undermining abortion rights by according legal status to 
the fetus; thus, surrogacy legislation should not allow parentage to be 
determined prior to the birth of a child. 
181. See Drew DeSilver, U.S. Income Inequality, on Rise for Decades, Is Now Highest Since 
1928, PEW RES. CENTER (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/05/u-s-
income-inequality-on-rise-for-decades-is-now-highest-since-1928/. 
182. Of course, such requirements would help place surrogacy out of reach for people with less 
means, who are already less likely to be able to afford surrogacy arrangements. 
183. “Nothing in this chapter may be construed to limit or constrain the right of the woman acting 
as surrogate to make all health and welfare decisions regarding herself and her pregnancy, including 
the right whether or not to terminate the pregnancy as protected by law.” H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 57(6)(a) (Wash. 2011), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/ 
Bills/House%20Bills/1267.pdf. 
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Further, as explained above, if women’s health is a priority, then 
surrogacy regulation should not insist upon gestational—as opposed to 
traditional—surrogacy, as traditional surrogacy imposes fewer health 
risks on the pregnant woman. The opposition to allowing traditional 
surrogacy is based in a belief that the lack of genetic relationship will 
make it easier for the women acting as surrogate to give up the child, 
and will make it easier for the intended parents to establish their legal 
relationship to the child. These are untenable assumptions, in that the 
first is not borne out by the experiences of women acting as surrogates, 
and the second has nothing to do with the law as it should be, but only 
the law as it is. Further, as explained above, traditional surrogacy may 
best protect women’s health. For these reasons, and because progressive 
feminism recognizes that genetic relationship is not determinative of 
bonds of love and affection between people, traditional surrogacy should 
be recognized in the regulation of compensated surrogacy. 
Finally, the health consequences to the woman acting as surrogate —
particularly the risks posed by multiple embryo transfer in gestational 
surrogacy arrangements—should be addressed. Multiple embryo transfer 
poses health risks to the woman, increasing the likelihood of a multiple 
pregnancy.184 The pressure to produce a pregnancy may induce 
physicians and intended parents to insist on multiple embryo transfer,185 
despite the American Society of Reproductive Medicine’s 
recommendations to limit the numbers of attempts as well as the 
numbers of embryos transferred to the woman’s uterus.186 To address 
this, surrogacy legislation should—like proposed Washington State 
House Bill 1267—require surrogacy contracts to ensure that the health 
care providers involved in the surrogacy process follow the guidelines of 
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine.187 
D. Non-Discrimination 
Putting the non-discrimination principle into practice in crafting 
184. See The Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. & the Practice Comm. of the 
Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., Criteria for Number of Embryos to Transfer: A Committee 
Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 44, 45 (2013) [hereinafter Criteria for Number of Embryos to 
Transfer]. 
185. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 133, at A1 (reporting on a California surrogacy lawyer who was 
approached by a client from outside the United States, who wanted the woman acting as surrogate to 
have six embryos transferred; the lawyer refused to work with him). 
186. See Criteria for Number of Embryos to Transfer, supra note 184. 
187. H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 57 (3)(a)(i) (Wash. 2011), available at 
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1267.pdf. 
 
                                                     
05 - Ainsworth_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014  6:28 PM 
1116 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1077 
progressive surrogacy legislation raises some challenging questions. 
Surrogacy laws in the United States contain a variety of restrictions on 
eligibility to participate as intended parents and as surrogates. Both 
parties generally must be adults to participate.188 It is typical to require 
both parties to have a mental health evaluation, and for the woman 
acting as surrogate to have a physical health evaluation as well.189 
Washington’s proposed legislation would have limited eligibility to act 
as a surrogate to women who have already given birth to at least one 
child.190 Other laws allow only married couples to become intended 
parents,191 or limit surrogacy to those who can demonstrate that they are 
either medically or socially infertile.192 
Some of these restrictions are very troubling from a feminist 
perspective. The most obvious discrimination is against LGBTQ parents, 
in those states that limit availability of surrogacy arrangements to legally 
married couples and where marriage equality is not yet recognized. But 
it is similarly demeaning of single people, regardless of sexual 
orientation, to suggest that they should not have access to this route to 
procreation. It also undermines reproductive autonomy to restrict the 
reasons that a person may engage in surrogacy, i.e., by restricting its 
availability to people that are “infertile.” Feminists should be gravely 
concerned when a legal restriction is based on stereotypes of women, as 
this one certainly is, suggesting that some women have vacuous, trivial, 
or wrong-headed reasons for their procreative decisions.193 
188. The Supreme Court of Connecticut considered surrogacy laws in various jurisdictions in 
Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 802 n.40 (Conn. 2011) (“For example, Florida requires that both 
the gestational carrier and the intended parents be eighteen years or older. Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 742.15(1) (West 2010). Illinois requires that the gestational carrier must be at least twenty-one 
years of age. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47 / 20 (a)(1) (West 2009). New Hampshire requires that all 
parties to the contract must be at least twenty-one years of age. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168–B:17 (I) 
(2002).”).  
189. Id. at 803 n.46. 
190. Wash. H.R. 1267 § 56 (1)(b). 
191. Raftopol, 12 A.3d at 802 n.38. As of 2011, Florida, Nevada, and Texas expressly required 
intended parents to be married; Arkansas law requires marriage, in effect, by permitting only a 
biological intended father to have parental rights through a surrogacy arrangement, unless he was 
married; in that case, his wife would have parental rights regardless of biological relationship. Id.  
192. Id. at 802 n.39. 
193. See, e.g., Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 225 (2009) (“In no other area of healthcare does the 
State override a competent adult’s right to consent to a medical procedure that falls within the 
bounds of proven and accepted medical practice, and in fact may be physically safer for the patient, 
based on the State’s unsubstantiated view that the treatment will be psychologically harmful to the 
patient. The law only subjects the gender-specific abortion decision to this kind of doubt about 
patient decision-making capacity, therefore denying that women have the same ability as men to 
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Thus, surrogacy legislation should ensure that these arrangements are 
open to adult people regardless of marital status, sexual orientation, or 
their reasons for seeking a surrogacy arrangement. The more challenging 
issues are whether age restrictions, health restrictions, and experiences 
of previous childbirth are valid restrictions. Applying our guidelines 
discussed above, the question is whether these restrictions either advance 
or undermine equality and principles of anti-subordination. 
Age restrictions are a common feature of United States law and 
jurisprudence. Feminist law reformers attempt to balance the procreative 
autonomy of teens and young girls and their rights not to be treated or 
seen in law as property of adults, with protection from the vulnerabilities 
imposed by the dependency of children on adults.194 Surrogacy, as many 
commentators have explained, is an unusual mix of contract and family 
law, in a context of evolving technology and lack of regulation.195 
Reconsidering rules that protect children from exploitation is not within 
the scope of this Article, but the question is an important one. Legal 
Voice, in its work on the proposed Washington State surrogacy 
legislation, determined to accept the twenty-one and over age restriction, 
recognizing (pragmatically) that evolution in this area may require 
reevaluation. 
Similarly, Legal Voice accepted a restriction that required a woman 
acting as surrogate to have had one prior birth. Again, this was a 
pragmatic decision based on what appears to be the practice of women 
acting as surrogates. The women we talked with, the women in empirical 
studies, and the women whose experiences are reported in case law and 
in the media, usually came to the decision to act as a surrogate after 
having had at least one child of their own.196 Nonetheless, we 
approached this provision with some hesitation, seeing it as potentially 
essentializing (only women who have had children could understand 
what it means to act as a surrogate) as well as paternalistic (women’s 
thought processes are emotional and the only way they can know 
whether they can give up a child through surrogacy is through having 
make informed healthcare decisions.” (emphasis in original)). 
194. See, e.g., Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child’s Right to Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L. 
REV. 1119, 1162 (1999) (critiquing parental involvement in abortion laws as impositions on minors’ 
medical decision-making and suggesting different standards for judicial bypass of parental notice in 
the states that require parental involvement). 
195. See Stark, supra note 82. 
196. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 22 (“Women who decide to embark on surrogacy often have 
completed a family of their own and feel that they wish to help a couple who would not otherwise 
be able to become parents.” (quoting Vasai Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experience of Surrogate 
Mothers, 18 HUM. REPROD. 2196 (2003)). 
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had their own child). It also suggests that the potential for regret should 
be the basis of public policy, an idea that is also deeply paternalistic and 
strongly echoes the troubling views of women’s decision-making 
demonstrated in abortion jurisprudence.197 Ideally, this provision would 
not be included, to deter the view of women as incapable of making 
informed decisions. 
Finally, the mental and physical health evaluation requirements for all 
parties or just the surrogate, present in many state laws, troubled us as 
well. First, if the tests are required simply to give the parties information 
about each other, such an exchange could be helpful. But the purpose of 
these provisions are unclear: are the provisions intended purely for the 
information of the parties, or are they intended to weed out from 
surrogacy people with certain mental health or physical conditions? 
Legal Voice settled on agreeing to mutual screening provisions that 
seemed designed to give the parties information, but arguing against a 
provision that expressly excluded women with mental health diagnoses 
from participation as surrogates, because such provisions stigmatize 
people with mental health conditions—a stigma to which women are 
particularly vulnerable.198 
E. Clarity 
The provisions above tend to increase clarity, but this principle is 
most important when considering one of the most controversial aspects 
of surrogacy legislation: whether the law should recognize the intended 
parents as the child’s parents at birth, without giving the woman acting 
as surrogate a designated time period in which to change her mind and 
void that aspect of the contract. Many argue that surrogacy legislation, if 
it is to exist at all, should treat surrogacy like adoption: the intended 
parents must pass a home inspection, like those required for adoptive 
parents; and the woman acting as surrogate has the right, typically within 
forty-eight hours of the birth of the child, to change her mind and retain 
197. The problem, of course, is that a person may regret any number of life decisions, but it is 
only women’s decisions that are the subject of regulation. See Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. 
Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1045 n.12 (D. Neb. 2010) (“The most important choices have 
consequences, and no matter how well-reasoned and fully deliberated, those decisions can lead to 
remorse. That is part of the price we pay for our freedom. (Only Edith Piaf was without regret. Had 
she been sober, she, too, might have had second-thoughts.)”). 
198. See Levent Kuey, Stigma, Women, and Mental Health, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF WOMEN 
AND MENTAL HEALTH 3, 5 (Dora Kohen ed., 2011) (“Being a woman with mental ill health puts the 
person under a double burden of discrimination.”). 
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legal rights to the child.199 Others note, correctly, that parents who can 
conceive a child with a partner bear no such burdens; there are no 
controls on the quality of their home, and they are not required to 
undergo evaluations. Those who make this argument suggest that people 
having children through surrogacy are similarly situated to those parents, 
rather than to adoptive parents.200 
Those arguing on behalf of the woman acting as surrogate argue that 
her motherhood is a reality, and that parental rights—that she may 
voluntarily extinguish—should attach to the child born through a 
surrogacy arrangement, whether or not the woman acting as surrogate 
contributed the gametes for conception. Thus, the law should recognize 
both sets of rights—her own and the intended parents’—to potential 
parenthood, and create a system that either allows them to keep these 
rights coextensively, or terminates one set in favor of the other.201 
Typically, the proposed system is much like the adoption scheme 
described above, where the woman has a statutory waiting period in 
which to decide whether to voluntarily terminate or maintain her 
parental rights. 
Legal Voice determined, and this Article recommends, supporting 
surrogacy legislation that unequivocally recognizes the parental rights of 
the intended parent immediately upon the birth of the child, with no 
revocation period for the woman acting as surrogate. This decision was 
not reached without controversy, and it may be one of the hardest 
questions for feminist law reformers to resolve, once they decide to 
engage in regulating surrogacy. All sides offer persuasive arguments 
based in sound feminist principles.202 Again, Legal Voice rested its 
decision on a pragmatic feminist approach, relying on the evidence so 
far gleaned from people who have engaged in surrogacy arrangements, 
and from an assessment of the various risks and responsibilities that each 
type of regulatory response would entail. 
That evidence indicates—as can be extrapolated from the relatively 
low number of reported legal disputes in surrogacy arrangements—that 
the vast majority of women acting as surrogates voluntarily, and most 
often, happily, plan to and do give the child to the intended parents.203 
199. See Shapiro, supra note 84.  
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 2350–52 (showing her interviews with numerous women 
acting as surrogates revealed a sense of satisfaction and little conflict with the intended parents); 
supra Part II.A. But see Janet Cawley, Surrogate Moms Fight the “Slavery,” CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 
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Women acting as surrogates generally do not see themselves as having 
parental ties or rights, although they do retain a belief that they have a 
special connection to the child and may want to maintain some kind of 
ongoing relationship.204 Throughout the pregnancy, they actively 
maintain an emotional distance, perhaps better characterized as a unique 
emotional relationship to the pregnancy.205 Thus, as a practical matter, a 
revocation period is typically not necessary. 
But a revocation period could be potentially harmful to the woman 
acting as surrogate (and the child). Since most women acting as 
surrogates do so with no intention of having to care for and raise the 
child, the waiting period in which they have parental rights to the child 
places them at risk of the intended parents changing their minds, and 
leaving them with that unintended and unwanted responsibility. As noted 
above, the unrelenting negative discourse directed at having and or 
raising a baby with a disability poses the risk—apparently very real206—
that the intended parents would balk at raising a child with a disability 
out of misinformation and fear, and decide not to invoke their potential 
parental rights. Although it is not just new babies with disabilities that 
could be left with women acting as surrogates—a change in the 
circumstances of the intended parents, such as a death or divorce, could 
also lead them to change their mind about raising the baby. Although 
this scenario is a very uncommon, it as just as likely as the very 
uncommon scenario in which the woman acting as surrogate changes her 
mind.207 
In my view, the rights of all parties, including the child, are better 
protected when the law is unequivocal about parental rights and 
responsibilities upon the child’s birth. The child is never left parentless; 
the intended parents are both assured of and required to assume their 
parental obligations; and the woman acting as surrogate knows in 
1987, at 1–2 (reporting on the formation of a national coalition against surrogacy, led by a man and 
joined by three women, including Mary Beth Whitehead, who had been surrogates, regretted it, and 
opposed legal enforcement of surrogacy contracts). 
204. Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 67–73. 
205. Id. 
206. See, e.g., Beth Greenfield, California Couple Shares Surrogate Story in Wake of Thailand 
Controversy, YAHOO! HEALTH (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/health/california-couple-
shares-surrogate-story-in-wake-of-95207128652.html (reporting the story of Keston and Andrea 
Ott-Dahl, a California couple who had agreed that Andrea would be a surrogate mother for another 
lesbian couple who were having trouble getting pregnant. When that couple learned that the baby 
would be born with Down Syndrome, they balked and refused to go through with the agreement. 
Andrea refused to abort the baby, with her partner’s agreement, and they kept and are raising the 
child). 
207. See Busby & Vun, supra note 44, at 35–38. 
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advance exactly what will happen when she agrees to act as a surrogate, 
and is never left with parental responsibility for a child she did not 
intend to raise. At the same time, the arguments for recognizing 
pregnancy as a meaningful relationship to the child are also valid; for 
this reason, surrogacy legislation should provide for an 
acknowledgement to the child of its parentage and birth, and the right of 
the woman acting as surrogate to maintain some level of connection to 
the family and the resulting child.208 
F. Justice 
Finally, we reach the most difficult question: how do we ensure 
justice in surrogacy regulation when social and economic realities 
constrain the procreative lives of so many? As Dorothy Roberts 
explains, “[p]rocreative liberty cannot be separated from concerns about 
equality. In fact, the very meaning of reproductive liberty is inextricably 
intertwined with issues of social justice.”209 We must be extremely 
careful when government sanction, legal rules, economic inequality, and 
the meaning of parenting, family, and motherhood collide. 
One method, suggested by Dorothy Roberts, is to increase access to 
reproductive technologies, and to devote resources to addressing the root 
causes of infertility. Progressive feminists should work to create a world 
in which people’s reproductive health is valued and supported, and 
surrogacy decisions, when they happen, are reached in a context of 
equality between intended parents and the woman acting as surrogate. 
Unfortunately, it remains the case that communities of color and those 
with fewer resources are more likely, for a variety of reasons, to 
experience problems with infertility, but are the least likely to have the 
resources to employ assisted reproductive technologies.210 
Progressive surrogacy regulation would attempt to engender equality 
by creating systems for increasing resources to the communities that 
need access to these technologies. For example, a surrogacy bill could 
include funding for a legislative mandate to increase research on 
environmental causes of disparate fertility rates, and to support programs 
208. I recognize that this is a bald statement that begs additional analysis. From a reproductive 
justice perspective, this question is best answered by considering the experiences of women acting 
as surrogates and the children born of surrogacy arrangements, as well as the needs of intended 
parents raising those children. 
209. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 287. 
210. See Tanzina Vega, Infertility, Endured Through a Prism of Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2014, at A12 (explaining that married black women are twice as likely as married white women to 
face infertility, but significantly less likely to access fertility services). 
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that research and respond to the reproductive health care disparities—
including maternal mortality, rates of miscarriage and stillbirth, and 
premature birth—experienced by women of color. Efforts to regulate 
compensated surrogacy should be accompanied by policies that provide 
for maternal mortality reviews, increase funding to map access points to 
prenatal and neonatal care, ensure prenatal care for immigrants, and 
improve culturally aware services and language access.211 
Arguably, regulating surrogacy in the states will also help increase 
justice for women in other countries, by encouraging surrogacy to take 
place locally. Local surrogacy will allow for closer monitoring and study 
of its effects on women acting as surrogates (and other parties and 
children, too). It is hard to predict whether and how that will increase 
protections for women in other countries—it could, in the short term, 
have the effect of making women agree to engage in surrogacy for even 
less compensation if there are fewer intended parents seeking their 
services. But it is not surrogacy that is at the root of Global North 
exploitation of Global South countries, people, and women’s bodies.212 
Reproductive tourism is but a highly visible symptom of a much greater 
problem—a problem that is also a feminist and progressive imperative to 
address. 
Finally, there is a local injustice that local surrogacy regulation can 
readily address: the problem of third party brokers,213 who, with few 
exceptions, are entirely unregulated. Lawyers and doctors are subject to 
ethical rules that limit, somewhat, their ability to freely broker these 
kinds of exchanges, but brokers who lack professional licenses face no 
such limitations.214 As explained above, this has led to situations in 
which brokers have stolen from or made false assurances to people, 
211. See, e.g., FLEDA MASK JACKSON, JOINT CTR. POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES HEALTH POLICY 
INST., RACE, STRESS, AND SOCIAL SUPPORT: ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN BLACK INFANT 
MORTALITY 7 (2007) (recommending policies that promote cultural competence, access, and 
improve and fund necessary research); NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., REFORM MATTERS: HEALTH 
REFORM: AN OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE HEALTH DISPARITIES AMONG WOMEN (2008), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Health%20Reform%20An%20Opportunity.pdf (reviewing 
health disparities and outlining several strategies to reduce inequality of health and access to health 
care); Access to Healthcare, BLACK WOMEN’S HEALTH IMPERATIVE, http://www.bwhi.org/ 
issues/healthcare/access-to-healthcare/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (highlighting the importance of 
initiatives that increase access to health care and health insurance). 
212. Rather, legacies of colonialism, trade policies, and other conditions have helped spur the 
reproductive tourism market. See, e.g., Birthing a Market, supra note 26, at 8 (“As pointed out in 
the Global Health Watch 3 Report, the lopsided free trade mandate brushes aside all ethical 
questions in the expanding ‘bio-capital’ industry.”). 
213. See Sanger, supra note 138. 
214. See Lewin, supra note 139. 
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putting women’s health at risk. Progressive legislation should require 
government regulation of third party brokers in order to decrease their 
economic incentives and limit their ability to exploit the parties to these 
arrangements. There are several ways to accomplish this end: prohibiting 
payment to third parties, licensing them in the manner of adoption 
agencies, or regulating their conduct short of licensing. Thus far, in all 
states where surrogacy is legal save California, surrogacy law does not 
address the role of brokers in surrogacy arrangements. 
Ultimately, progressive surrogacy legislation, guided by the principles 
outlined above, would: include respectful language and provisions that 
allow for both traditional and gestational surrogacy; be inclusive of 
LGBTQ people and non-stigmatizing towards people with mental health 
conditions or disabilities; impose regulations on brokers that prevent 
abuse; directly address social conditions that increase health disparities, 
especially maternal health; ensure clarity by recognizing the parental 
rights of intended parents upon the birth of the child; and ensure 
women’s health, medical, and reproductive decision-making. 
CONCLUSION 
Progressives have many pressing concerns—including addressing 
unchecked income inequality, protecting our democracy from purchase, 
ending mass incarceration and the violent and unjust policing of 
communities of color, and achieving justice for immigrants. Surrogacy 
affects fewer people, but if progressives ignore the issue and leave 
ownership to others, women’s voices are coopted and legislatures and 
courts may enact harmful rules that undermine reproductive justice. 
Having a baby for someone else in exchange for money is—and will 
be seen as—a women’s issue. Women’s rights leaders in the legal and 
legislative arenas should take leadership and work to pass legislation that 
honors women’s humanity, recognizes reproductive autonomy, affirms 
the rights of all people to form loving families and attachments, and 
directs resources at health care disparities. In the process, feminist 
leaders can move the conversation away from dehumanizing people with 
disabilities and essentializing women, to an inclusive framework that 
recognizes the complexities and intersecting identities of all. These ideas 
for progressive surrogacy legislation are a call to feminist law reformers 
to take ownership of surrogacy regulation, both despite and because of 
its complexities, and lead the way to reform that is pragmatic and 
grounded in principles of reproductive justice. 
 
 
